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2.1 Actual vs. model buffer capital ratios for the sample banks. This figure
shows mean buffer capital ratios (during 2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4) plotted against the
corresponding model dividend barriers. The filled triangles are with the trading
alphas and correlations equal to their estimated values while the empty squares are
with the statistically significant trading alphas and correlations (the non-significant
trading alphas and correlations are zero). Linear regression lines are drawn in
the figure. The numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations of the
parameters. Without the outlier (ABVA), the regression line for the estimated
parameters is y = 1.344 + 0.86x and R2 is 20%. Thus, then the regression line is
close to the regression line of the significant parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Comparative Statics. We use the following median parameter values over all the
banks: ζ = 95%, r = 2%, δ = 2%, σB = 0.3%, σT = 4%, ρBT = −0.1, αB = 0.4%,
αT = 0.4%, δ = 2%, and x = 0.5%. Figures below show how the value function
(2.7d) and dividend barrier u change with respect to banking proportion ζ, banking
volatility σB , trading volatility σT , correlation between the banking and trading
earnings ρBT , banking alpha αB , trading alpha αT , risk-free rate r, and wedge
between debt and equity finance δ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 Default probability changes with varying model parameters for Bank
FHN. We analyze two banks (FHN and MTB) and how their default probability
changes with respect to model parameters. We consider two cases: Case (i) is
without the Volcker rule and case (ii) is under the Volcker rule (no alpha bets). The
first bank is FHN and we use its estimated parameters in Table 2.1. Figures below
show how the default probability changes with respect to banking proportion ζ,
risk-free rate r, correlation between the banking and trading earnings ρBT , wedge
between debt and equity finance δ, banking volatility σB , trading volatility σT ,
banking alpha αB , and trading alpha αT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Default probability changes with varying model parameters for Bank
MTB. The second bank is MTB and we use its estimated parameters in Table 2.1.
Figures below show how the default probability changes with respect to banking
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ρBT , wedge between debt and equity finance δ, banking volatility σB , trading
volatility σT , banking alpha αB , and trading alpha αT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Actual vs. model values of banks at the mean out-of-sample equity level.
This figure shows realized market equity level during the out-of-sample period 2010
Q1 – 2011 Q4 plotted against the model value function evaluated at the mean out-of-
sample equity level. The filled triangles are with the banking and trading alphas and
correlations equal to their estimated values while the empty squares are with the
statistically significant banking and trading alphas and correlations ρBT , ρRE , ρRA
and ρAE (the non-significant alphas and correlations are zero). Linear regression
lines are drawn in the figure. The numbers in the parentheses are the standard
deviations of the parameters. One asterisk (∗) indicates the significance level of
5%, and two (∗∗) indicates 1%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
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As Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009) report, the Credit
Crunch of 2007-2009 involved a regulatory failure and the solution should not be
more regulation per se, but better and different regulation. Today we are certain only
about the “different” part since in many countries there are significant regulatory
changes,1 but we do not know their unintended consequences. In the U.S., Volcker
rule represents one of these regulatory changes.2 The rule limits banks’ proprietary
trading that is not at the behest of their clients and caps each bank’s ownership in
hedge funds and private equity funds at three percent of the assets. Certain activities
such as market making, hedging, securitization, and risk management are exempted.
Banks have a seven year time frame to become compliant with the regulation.
Reform advocates such as the consumer coalition Americans for Financial Reform
think Volcker rule is too weak, and, on the other hand, banks believe it is too costly.3
For instance, JPMorgan Chase estimates that the direct costs of the Volcker rule for
them will be $400 million - $600 million annually (see Economist, February 18th
1See e.g. European recommendations Liikanen (2012) and Vickers (2011).
2The Volcker rule is section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
and it was proposed by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. For more information: http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-65545.pdf, http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_
Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf, and http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf.
3See e.g. Reuters, October 11th 2011, “U.S. reveals Volcker rule’s murky ban on Wall St bets” by Dave Clarke and
Alexandra Alper, Dealbook, New York Times, February 13th 2012, “At Volcker Rule Deadline, a Strong Pushback
From Wall St.” by Ben Protess and Peter Eavis, and Dealbook, New York Times, February 22nd 2012, “The Volcker
Rule, Made Bloated and Weak” by Jesse Eisinger.
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2012, “The Dodd-Frank act; Too big not to fail”).
Several papers have studied bank capital’s role in regulation (see e.g. Hart and
Zingales 2011; Acharya, Kulkarni, and Richardson 2010; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
2008; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004; Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor 1998; Dangl
and Lehar 2004; Decamps, Rochet, and Roger 2004; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz
2000; Morrison and White 2005; and Repullo 2004). Some authors have focused
specifically on the Volcker rule. Konczal (2012) claims that the Volcker rule will
help with the conflicts of interest between banks and their clients and provide for
the stability of the economy by removing the “casino” part of the financial system
from the core banking parts. Despite the good intentions of the Volcker rule, the
rule has also received wide criticism. According to Chatterjee (2011), the rule as
proposed is doomed because banks are allowed to continue to trade on behalf of
their customers and because it is difficult to separate the client serving activity from
proprietary trading. Chow and Surti (2011), Whitehead (2011), and Duffie (2012)
argue that the implementation of the Volcker rule would reduce the quality and
capacity of market making services that banks provide to U.S. investors. Further,
activities identified as too risky for retail banks might migrate to the unregulated
parts of the financial system and this could increase systematic risk. Moreover, some
authors warn that the regulation may have also other unintended consequences. For
instance, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish (2012) present evidence that regulation
may contribute to a surge in delinquencies.
The goal of our study is to develop a framework with which we are able to estimate
and analyze the impact of the Volcker rule on banks’ market equity value and default
probability. To achieve this goal, we divide the trading into two parts: alpha bets
and hedging of basic banking cash flows. Under this stylized setup we develop two
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models that maximize the bank’s expected discounted dividends, i.e., the value of
bank market equity equity. In our models presented in Chapter II and III, the state
variable is a bank’s buffer capital ratio, i.e., accounting equity capital ratio over a
minimum capital level. If the buffer capital violates the minimum capital level then
the bank is liquidated.4 We solve the bank’s optimal policy (in maximizing the value
of the bank) for dividends, liquid asset investments, and the allocation of assets into
trading and basic banking business in a single optimization model. This is important
since these decisions affect each other and, hence, cannot be analyzed separately. By
dynamic programming, the value function satisfies an ordinary differential equation
that we solve numerically. We ignore the implementation costs and risks such as
differences between federal and state regulators found in Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and
Trebbi (2012).
Several other papers have also modeled banks and other firms’ optimal actions
with similar stochastic models. The basic theoretical continuous time model of a
capital constrained firm is presented in Milne and Robertson (1996). That paper is
extended in Milne and Whalley (2001), Milne (2004), and Peura and Keppo (2006)
to allow for a recapitalization option. Peura and Keppo also calibrate their model
to accounting data on U.S. commercial banks and show that this class of models
explains about 40% of the variation in the buffer capital levels. We confirm this
finding in our analysis. Keppo, Kofman, and Meng (2010) consider a model with
liquid risky asset investment. In our models in Chapter II and III we extend their
framework by considering the proportion of trading assets as a free variable and by
including the correlation between banking and trading cash flows to the model. The
4We model the effect of capital via an elevated survival probability. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) develop a model
in which capital induces the bank to monitor borrowers. This suggests that bank capital has also a positive effect on
monitoring. We do not model this effect directly. However, our cross-sectional analysis on the sample of U.S. banks
suggests that the model explains a significant part of the variation in the banks’ buffer capital ratios.
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correlation is an important variable in our analysis since it allows hedging of the
banking cash flows. Estrella (2004) uses a variant of the classical inventory or cash
management models to study cyclicality of bank capital. Consistent with our model,
Mehran and Thakor (2011) find that bank value and its components (the stand-alone
values of banks assets and liabilities and the synergies among them) are positively
cross-sectionally related to bank capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a simple stochas-
tic model with no recapitalization and results. Chapter III presents another stochas-
tic model with recapitalization. Each of Chapter II and Chapter III includes the
calibration results, cross-sectional test, and comparative statics using its respective
model. Chapter IV concludes.
4
CHAPTER II
A Simple Stochastic Control Model with No
Recapitalization
2.1 Model
We introduce our first model with no recapitalization. Recapitalization activities
include issuing or re-purchasing a bank’s own stock. In this section we present the
used stochastic processes and the objective of the bank under consideration. This
model is based on Milne and Robertson (1996) and Keppo et al. (2010). We analyze
a single bank that maximizes its expected discounted dividends. Consistent with
Basel banking rules (Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision 1996a,b,c), we divide
the bank’s assets into banking book and trading book.
The banking book consists of loans that are not marked to market for manage-
rial and accounting purposes. The trading book is a portfolio of different traded
instruments (e.g. stocks, bonds, swaps, forward contracts and other derivative in-
struments) that are usually marked to market daily.
We assume that the bank’s total risk-weighted assets RW (t)5 grow at a positive
risk-free rate r, so that
RW (t) = RW (0)ert (2.1)
5Risk-weighted assets are calculated as a weighted sum of a bank’s nominal risk exposures, where the weights
depend on product type and counterparty sector. According to Peura and Keppo (2006), risk-weighted assets are
typically between 65% and 70% of total assets.
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for some initial positive amount RW (0). This implies that our bank is in a steady
state and its total risk-weighted assets grow at a risk-free rate due to new loans and
investments.6 The bank operates up to liquidation. The liquidation time is defined
as the first time when equity hits zero:
τ = inf{t|X̄(t) ≤ 0},
where τ is the liquidation time and X̄(t) is the accounting value of bank equity (bank
capital) at time t. The credit risk requirement can be modeled by defining X̄ as the
capital above the minimum capital level (see e.g. Peura and Keppo 2006). We use a
minimum capital level in our model calibration and set the minimum level equal to
8% of the total risk-weighted assets (this is about the minimum capital level in our
dataset).
We assume that earnings from the banking book and the trading book are propor-
tional to the bank assets. Banking book equals a fixed proportion of the assets and
the rest of the assets are in the trading book. Thus, the bank dedicates certain fixed
proportion of its assets to the basic banking business. The trading book consists
of a liquid risky asset investment and a risk-free investment. The bank trades the
assets in the trading book continuously without any frictions. More specifically, the
cumulative earnings processes under the risk-neutral probability measure (see e.g.
Bjork 2009) are given by
dEB(t) = RW (t)ζ(r + αB)dt+RW (t)ζσBdWB(t),
dET (t) = RW (t)(1− ζ)θ(t)(r + αT )dt
+RW (t)(1− ζ)θ(t)σTdWT (t) +RW (t)(1− ζ)(1− θ(t))rdt
= RW (t)(1− ζ)[r + θ(t)αT ]dt+RW (t)(1− ζ)θ(t)σTdW (t), (2.2)
6As pointed out in Keppo et al. (2010), we can justify this in two ways: (1) the growth rate of RWA has only
a second order effect on the buffer stock, and (2) RWA fluctuates significantly less than the corresponding market
prices due to the definition of RWA.
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where EB(t) and ET (t) are the banking and trading book cumulative earnings at
time t, r is the risk-free rate, ζ is the constant proportion of RW (t) in the banking
book and ζ ∈ [ζl, 1], ζl > 0 is the minimum size of the banking book (so that the firm
is still considered as a bank), θ(t) is the proportion of the trading book invested in
the liquid risky asset and θ(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0, αB and αT are banking book and
trading book alphas, σB and σT are banking book and trading book volatilities and
σB, σT > 0,WB(t) and WT (t) are Wiener processes under the risk-neutral probability
measure corresponding to EB and ET and their correlation is ρBT .
If (2.2) is under the risk-neutral measure then it would be natural to assume that
αT = 0 (see e.g. Bjork 2009). However, this implies that a bank engages in trading
business only to hedge their risk from banking business (see Corollary 2.12) and this
is not what we observe in the market. Therefore, we assume that the bank is able
to generate alpha, in which case αT > 0. This excess return could be, for instance,
from market making or it just reflects the bank shareholders’ expectation for the
future returns. We assume the bank is able to control θ(t) in continuous time. It
can also choose ζ, but this parameter is constant. We do not specify the trading and
banking activities that create the alphas (excess returns αB and αT ). In our model
they are just alphas of the trading and banking books, and in the model calibration
we estimate the parameters from accounting and market data.
By (2.2), the earnings of the bank follow
dE(t) = dEB(t) + dET (t)
= RW (t)[r + ζαB + (1− ζ)θ(t)αT ]dt+
+RW (t)[ζσBdWB(t) + (1− ζ)θ(t)σTdWT (t)] (2.3)
and, thus, the earnings depend on the asset size, the earnings parameters, and
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the bank’s trading. As we can see, the earnings volatility depends on the asset
quality: The more is invested in trading, the higher the earnings volatility (typically,
σT > σB). The earnings are added to bank equity, i.e., to the bank’s capital.
The bank controls its bank capital also through dividend payments that can be
implemented instantaneously without any costs. Formally, a capital control policy π̄
is a collection (ζ π̄, {θπ̄(t), Lπ̄(t)}), where ζ π̄ is the proportion of total risk-weighted
assets in the banking book under policy π̄, θπ̄(t) is the proportion of trading book
in the risky liquid asset at time t, and Lπ̄(t) is the cumulative amount of dividends
at time t. We denote by Π the class of admissible policies and they satisfy:
(i) ζ π̄ ∈ [ζl, 1], where ζl > 0, and ζ π̄ is constant during the lifetime of the bank
(ii) θπ̄(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0 and it is adapted to Ft, where filtration {Ft} is
generated by the Wiener processes WB(t) and WT (t)
(iii) Lπ̄t is a non-decreasing right-continuous process adapted to Ft and L
π̄
0− = 0.
Condition (i) indicates that the bank cannot change the proportion of the risk-
weighted assets in the banking book after it has selected that. Thus, the banking
business is a long-term investment with long-term commitments. By (ii), short
selling is not allowed and the bank cannot invest more than its trading book in the
risky asset. Condition (iii) says that dividends cannot be negative.
Bank capital as a function of policy π̄ is denoted by X̄ π̄(t) and, by (2.3), it satisfies:

















R(u)[ζ π̄σBdWB(u) + (1− ζ π̄)θπ̄(u)σTdWT (u)]− Lπ̄(t). (2.4)
The integral terms are the gains and losses from the trading and banking books. The
last term is the cumulative dividend process. Thus, cumulative profits feed to the
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capital, while dividend payments and cumulative losses represent a leakage from the
capital. The first integral term represents that bank capital also earns the risk-free
rate.7
By risk-neutral pricing, the market value of bank equity is the expected discounted
dividends until liquidation. Thus, the market equity value under policy π̄ and initial







where E is expectation under the risk-neutral probability measure, δ is a positive
constant representing the wedge between debt and equity finance due to capital
market frictions such as taxation and agency costs of equity.8 The wedge satisfies
δ > max[αB, αT ], which gives V̄π̄(x̄) <∞. Thus, the excess return in (2.3) and (2.4)
is less than the wedge between debt and equity finance.
The problem is to identify the value of an optimally managed bank:
V̄ (x̄) = sup
π̄∈Π
V̄π̄(x̄) (2.6)
and an admissible policy which achieves this value.
7As in Peura and Keppo (2006), this assumption can be justified in several ways. We assume that bank capital
is explicitly invested in a risk-free asset. Alternatively, we could postulate that any capital the bank has replaces
an equivalent of borrowing/deposit funding and that the effective cost of borrowing/deposits to the bank equals the
risk-free rate. The latter assumption, in turn, could be justified by the presence of deposit insurance.
8As pointed out in Keppo et al. (2010), the parameter δ should not be interpreted as equity risk premium since it is
assumed constant and does not depend on bank leverage. This suggests that our modeling framework is risk-neutral
(risk-neutral share holders or risk-neutral probability measure). If the risk-neutral probability measure is used then
the drift term of buffer capital process need not coincide with its observed value. In particular, since uncertainty
in our model is driven by a Brownian Motion, a change of measure would influence the drift in (2.4), but not the
volatility.
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2.2 Characterization of Optimum
The capital dynamics defined in (2.4) are not time-homogenous, which makes
direct solution of the problem (2.6) difficult. However, the problem of capital control
can be transformed into a time-homogenous problem of capital ratio control through
a simple normalization. The normalized state variable, the bank capital ratio is given
by
X(t) = X̄(t)/RW (t).
From Peura and Keppo (2006) we get the following lemma that presents the capital
ratio control problem and shows its connection to the capital control problem (2.6).
Lemma II.1. (Capital control problem) Given an admissible policy π ∈ Π, the capital
ratio satisfies
Xπ(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0




[ζπσBdWB(u) + (1− ζπ)θπ(u)σTdWT (u)]− Lπ(t). (2.7a)
Define the liquidation time by
τπ = inf{t|Xπ(t) ≤ 0} (2.7b)








where the expectation is conditional on the capital ratio dynamics (2.7a). The value
function:




Then (2.6) can be expressed in terms of (2.7d) as
V̄ (X̄(0)) = RW (0)V (X(0)). (2.8)
Further, let π∗ be the policy which achieves the optimum in (2.7d). Then the optimal

















Thus, when π and π̄ are related through (2.9) then the capital ratio process (2.7a)
is the process of X̄ π̄(t)/RW (t). The proof is based on Ito’s lemma and equations
(2.1) and (2.3). Equation (2.8) implies that the objective function of the capital ratio
control problem, (2.7d), can be interpreted as the market value of bank equity as a
percentage of the total risk-weighted assets.
From Højgaard and Taksar (2004) we get the following lemma.
Lemma II.2. (Concavity) The value function in (2.7d) is increasing and concave.
We characterize the value function (2.7d) through a set of variational inequali-
ties. For this we define the infinitesimal generator I corresponding to (2.7a) for all




[ζ2σ2B+(1−ζ)2θ2σ2T+2ζσBρBT (1−ζ)θσT ]f ′′(x)+[r+ζαB+(1−ζ)θαT ]f ′(x).
(2.10)
Further, let us write the value function corresponding to banking proportion ζ ∈
[ζl, 1] as V
ζ(x). That is, V ζ(x) is the expected discounted dividends in (2.7c) and
(2.7d) for given ζ.
Now we get the following proposition. The proof follows from standard arguments
(see e.g. Højgaard and Taksar 1999 or Fleming and Soner 2005).
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Proposition II.3. (Value function) The value function corresponding to banking
book proportion ζ ∈ [ζl, 1] solves
LIQUIDATION: V ζ(0) = 0 (2.11a)
OUTSIDE DIVIDENDS: δV ζ(x) = Iθ∗V




= 1 for all x ≥ u (2.11c)
















θ∗(x) is solved in Subsection 2.5.2 for an easy implementation. The optimal policy
can be understood as follows. Dividends are paid so as to never let the capital ratio
rise above u, and between the dividend payments the bank invests actively in the
risky financial asset. The optimal trading strategy solves max(Iθ − δ)V ζ(x) = 0.
Note that, by (2.10) and Lemma II.2, (Iθ − δ)V ζ(x) is concave with respect to
θ ∈ [0, 1] and, thus, the first order condition gives the optimal trading strategy
θ∗. The term − ζσBρBT
(1−ζ)σT








is from the alpha of the trading strategy. The hedging
term has its maximum value when the correlation equals −1, and the alpha term is
increasing in the alpha of the trading, αT . Note that hedging increases value because,
by Lemma II.2, the value function is concave and hedging decreases volatility. The
max and min functions in (2.12) are due to the trading constraint.
Proposition II.3 follows from standard dynamic programming arguments applied
to the Bellman equation. By (2.11a), when the capital ratio hits zero the bank is
liquidated. The slope condition at the dividend barrier (2.11c) and the differen-
tial equation between the dividend times (2.11b) hold since paying dividends and
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trading are always admissible. We note that the smooth pasting and the super con-
tact conditions are required for V ζ at the dividend barrier, i.e., ∂V
ζ(x)
∂x
|x=u = 1 and
∂2V ζ(x)
∂x2
|x=u = 0 (see Dumas 1991).
In case of nonzero correlation between the banking and trading earnings, the value
function in Proposition II.3 has to be solved numerically.9 If the correlation is zero,
i.e., ρBT = 0 then we get the model in Keppo et al. (2010). Further, note that if
ζ = 1 then the bank invests all the wealth in the banking business and, therefore,
the value function is independent of trading since then there are no trading assets.
In this case the model equals Peura and Keppo (2006). For ζ ∈ [ζl, 1), the smooth
pasting and the super contact conditions with Lemma II.2 lead to an explicit formula
for the value function (2.11) at the dividend barrier u:
Lemma II.4. (Value at dividend barrier) Let τ > 0, αT > 0, σT 6= 0, and ζ ∈ [ζl, 1).
Then the value function at the dividend barrier is given by
V ζ(u) =
r + ζαB + (1− ζ)αT
δ
(2.13)
and θ∗(u) = 1, i.e., the bank has the maximum position in the liquid risky asset at





Further, if αT = 0 then θ
∗(u) = max{0,min[1,− ζσBρBT
(1−ζ)σT
]}, and if αT < 0 then
θ∗(u) = 0, i.e., then the bank has the minimum position in the liquid risky asset at
the barrier.
Proof: By (2.11b) and the value matching, smooth pasting, and super contact con-
9We use a standard finite difference approximation method to solve the value function (see e.g. Kushner and
Dupuis 2000, Section 5.1) and implemented the method in Matlab.
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ditions at u, we have
V ζ(u) = sup
θ∈[0,1]
[(r + ζαB + (1− ζ)θαT )/δ].
First, if αT = 0 then we get (2.14) directly and, by Proposition 2.12, θ
∗(u) is as
given in the lemma. Second, if αT > 0 then θ
∗(u) = 1 and (2.13) follows. Finally, if
αT < 0 then θ
∗(u) = 0 and (2.14) follows.

By Lemma II.4, the value function at the dividend time is given by the simple
equations (2.13) and (2.14) which do not include the banking and trading volatilities
or their correlation. However, the dividend barrier u (solved by the value matching
and smooth pasting conditions) and, therefore, also the dividend time depend on the
volatilities and the correlation.
From (2.12) we get the following corollary.
Corollary II.5. (Trading) If the trading alpha and the correlation between the bank-
ing and trading cash flows are both zero then the bank does not trade. That is, if
αT = 0 and ρBT = 0 then θ
∗(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, u].
This result implies that there are two motivations for trading: alpha generating
bets and the hedging of banking earnings. When the trading alpha and the correla-
tion are zero then there is no trading. In this case our model is given by Peura and
Keppo (2006).
So far we have analyzed the value function with given banking book size ζ ∈ [ζl, 1].
Next we discuss about the optimal ζ and for this we define Υx(ζ) = V ζ(x), where x
is the buffer capital at time 0. The optimal ζ is solved at time 0 and it is constant:
ζ∗ = arg maxζ∈[ζl,1]Υ
x(ζ). By the extreme value theorem, Υ attains its maximum on
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[ζl, 1]. The maximum value is either at a local maximum in (ζl, 1), or at a boundary
(ζl or 1), i.e., at the point where the derivative is zero or at a boundary. We solve ζ
numerically by testing these candidates.
Note that if ζ was time varying then we would solve that from (2.11b) similarly














θσT (θσT − σBρBT )
σ2B + θ
2σ2T − 2σBρBT θσT
]}
,
where, by Lemma II.2, the first term besides θαT −αB is negative. This implies that
the higher the banking alpha relative to the trading alpha, the bigger the banking
book size is. Since typically σT > σB, the last term is positive if θ ≥ ρBT .
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2.3 Model Calibration
In this section we calibrate this model to twelve U.S. banks during 2000 Q1 –
2011 Q4. This period was selected to include the most current period after the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 on late 1999.10 We use the twelve banks
because for them we have required accounting data for our analysis over this time
period from the Compustat Database.11 We also use the banks’ risk-weighted assets
and tier 1 capital data from the Bank Regulatory Databases for the banks’ asset
and core capital sizes, the banks’ stock price and shares outstanding from CRSP
for the market value of shareholders’ equity (the shares outstanding are used with
the model’s market capitalization), the yield on 3-month U.S. treasury bill for the
risk-free interest rate, and the S&P 500 index for the market portfolio.
2.3.1 Banks
The banks are introduced in Table 2.1. As we can see, the banks’ average to-
tal risk-weighted assets during the time period vary from below three billion USD
(ABVA, HTLF, and TMP) to over 500 billion USD (BAC, JPM, and WFC). The big
banks have smaller buffer capital ratios than the small banks have: The correlation
between the buffer capital ratio12 and the risk-weighted asset size is -0.44. This is
consistent with the “too big to fail” concept since if the big banks know that they are
so large and so interconnected that their failure would be disastrous to the economy,
and which therefore must be supported by government when they face difficulty, then
it might be optimal for the big banks to maximize the value of the bailout option by
10The Glass-Steagall separation of investment and deposit banking was generally repealed by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 during the administration of Bill Clinton.
11Compustat data variables include: total assets, trading account securities, federal funds sold and securities
borrowed or purchased under agreements to resell, interest income and expense on federal funds sold and securities
borrowed or purchased under agreements to resell comprehensive income, net gain (loss) from trading securities, tier
1 capital ratio, minority interest, and shareholders’ equity.
12In this model, we assume a fixed minimum requirement for all banks.
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running their business with a low buffer capital ratio.13 However, given the model
parameters (that might, at least partially, be driven by the above discussed moral
hazard), seven banks (CBSH, FHN, HTLF, JPM, STT, TMP, and WTFC) have
higher mean buffer capital ratios than this model dividend barriers (both under es-
timated parameters and under the significant parameters, columns under u in Table
2.1). Thus, these banks run their business with higher capital buffers than what is
optimal according to this model (the seven banks include both small and big banks)
and, therefore, each of these banks has a lower default probability than the corre-
sponding optimally managed bank has. However, the banks might have too high
earnings volatility due to the moral hazard problem discussed above and they might
have too much leverage because the banks pay low interest rates for their own debt
due to the government support (we do not model the government support). Higher
earnings volatility and leverage naturally increase the risks of the whole industry.
Most of the bank assets are in the basic banking business, eleven banks have
over 90% of their assets in the banking book. Only JPM has less than 90% of their
assets in the banking book. For all the banks, the banking earnings volatility is
lower than their trading volatility. This is consistent with DeYoung and Roland
(2001), Stiroh (2004, 2006), and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who find that movement
away from traditional banking activities toward other financial services increases
the volatility and market risk. Seven banks had negative correlation between the
banking and trading earnings. Negative correlation implies partial hedging of the
basic banking business. Seven banks out of twelve had higher trading alpha (excess
return) than the banking alpha. Some of the trading alphas are too high for forward
looking estimates. However, as explained in Table 2.1, the alphas are bounded above
13For more on this, see e.g. Haldane and Alessandri (2009) and Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012).
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by a technical condition and this model parameters are the 2000 Q1 - 2011 Q4
sample estimates. We do not know specifically which activities create their trading
alphas. For instance, many banks have profitable market making of which return
on capital can be high14, and during our sample time period many banks placed a
lot of assets that looked as a banking book-type into the trading book (e.g. CDO
tranches), possibly to take advantage of trading book’s lower capital requirements.
Further, many high trading alpha banks have high trading volatilities and, by the
concavity of the value function (Lemma II.2), this model bank might prefer not to
invest in the trading. To understand better the effect of different model parameters,
in Subsections 2.5.6 and 2.5.7 we analyze the model behavior with respect to wide
ranges of parameter values. For instance, we show in Subsection 2.5.7 that the
Volcker rule can raise the default probability of a bank even under a small trading
alpha. In the next subsection we explain the parameter estimation.
2.3.2 Model Parameters
For bank sizeRWt we use the total risk-weighted assets. This is consistent with the
Basel capital requirements since they are calculated by using the risk-weighted assets
(Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision 1996a,b,c), so they are not directly based
on market or accounting equity values. The risk-weighted assets help implementation
of the minimum capital level with a simple modification: In this section, capital ratio
(2.7a) is the banks’ tier 1 capital ratio15 (the ratio of tier 1 capital to the total risk-
weighted assets) in excess of a minimum capital level of 8%. We use 8% because it
is close to the minimum mean buffer capital value of our sample banks.16
14For instance, Morgan Stanley posted net trading gains every day during the second quarter of 2007 and Goldman
Sachs had only 11 losing days in their trading between April 2009 and April 2010 (see e.g. Bloomberg, May 13th
2010, “Rigged-Market Theory Scores a Perfect Quarter” by Jonathan Weil).
15Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulator’s point of view. It equals
shareholders’ equity plus minority interests minus portion of perpetual preferred stock and goodwill.
16Note that the minimum Basel II capital ratio is 8%, which is close to our minimum level. The U.S. did not fully
implement Basel II (see e.g. Verdier (2012)).
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Further, as in Peura and Keppo (2006), we use a common estimate for the wedge
between debt and equity finance for all the banks and set δ = 4%. Subsections
2.5.6 and 2.5.7 analyze the impact of these assumptions on the banks’ equity value,
dividend policy, and default probability.
The total risk-weighted assets are the sum of banking risk-weighted assets RWABt
and trading risk-weighted assets RWATt:
RWt = RWABt +RWATt.
17
Although the banking proportion ζ is optimized in this model, we estimate it as the
average of the time series for the ratio of the banking assets to the total assets i.e.
{RWABt/RWt}, which is ζd in Table 2.1. This assumption modifies the constraint
on the wedge δ given in Section 2.1 to δ > ζdαB + (1− ζd)αT .18 Further, note that ζ
is constant in this model, i.e., the banking asset size is a long term strategic decision
and, therefore, the observed ζd in Table 2.1 is not the same as the current optimal
ζ. As an example, if we set ζI = 75%, which is close to the minimum ζd in Table
2.1 (JPM), then the model’s optimal allocation in the banking business is given by
Table 2.1 (columns under ζ). Thus, according to this model, in this case the equity
value of six banks (ABVA, BAC, JPM, STI, TMP, and WFC; so, all the big banks
are in this group) would rise if the size of their trading units was decreased since
all these banks have optimal banking proportion higher than their current banking
proportion (under both the estimated parameters and the significant ones). This is
because all these banks have either a statistically significant negative trading alpha
or a statistically significant positive correlation between the trading and banking
17Risk-weighted banking assets RWABt and trading assets RWATt are assumed as: RWATt = RWt ·
trading-related assets
total assets
, and RWABt = RWt − RWABt where trading-related assets include (a) trading account secu-
rities and (b) federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell.
18 In Table 2.1, diamond symbol (♦) indicates trading alpha values which violate the δ-condition, i.e., which do
not satisfy αT < (δ − ζαB)/(1− ζ). These estimates are set to αT = (δ − ζαB)/(1− ζ)− ε where ε = 10−4 in our
analysis.
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cash flows, or the trading alpha and the correlation are insignificant and therefore
almost zero. That is, they have unprofitable trading or they do not hedge, or both
the trading and the hedging are not effective enough. Further, the equity value of
only four banks (CBSH, FHN, MTB, and STT) would rise under both the estimated
parameters and the significant ones if the trading books were increased. As we will
see in Table 2.2, because of this trading value, the default probability of the four
banks rises due to the Volcker rule.
All these four banks have significantly positive trading alphas. Thus, given all
the data in Table 2.1, it is not obvious that trading is vital for our sample banks.
However, note that here we simply assume that the banking business could keep its
profitability when it is expanded, which may not be the case. To avoid this problem,
in the next section we assume that if the trading is decreased then that money is
invested in a risk-free asset, not in the banking business. That is, the method of the
next section represents a more positive trading effect because the banking business
generates a positive alpha. Our model’s correct trading effect estimate is somewhere
between these two estimates.
Similarly as with the assets, total net comprehensive income NIt over period
(t− 1, t] is the sum of banking net income NIBt and trading net income NITt over
the same period:
NIt = NIBt +NITt
19.
However, to get trading net income (NITt) from the trading revenues we subtract
50% for compensation and infrastructure costs from all (positive) gains.20 This
19Some banks (e.g. Bank of America) define trading-related assets as the sum of: (i) trading account assets; (ii)
reverse purchases; (iii) securities borrowed; and (iv) derivative assets. We modify this definition of trading-related
assets according to the availability of data in Compustat as the sum of (a) trading account securities and (b) federal
funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell, and trading revenues as the sum of gain/loss on (a)
and interest income on (b) minus interest expense on federal funds purchased and securities sold under repurchase
agreements.
20I.e., NIT = max(0.5 · trading revenues, 0) + min(trading revenues, 0), and NIB = net comprehensive income
(including minority interests) - NIT.
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is consistent with the compensation at several leading banks.21 We analyze the
effect of this assumption in Subsections 2.5.6 and 2.5.7 by varying the trading alpha
parameter.
We define banking return on assets, ROBt, and trading return on assets, ROTt,








In other words, the returns are computed by dividing the net income of year t by
the corresponding assets in the previous year (t − 1). Volatilities σB and σT are
estimated as the annualized standard deviations of the time series {ROBt} and
{ROTt}, respectively. Parameter ρBT is the correlation between the time series.
Volatilities and correlations are in Table 2.1. Most of the volatilities are less than
5%, but there are three banks with over 50% annual trading volatility (ABVA, STT,
and WTFC). None of these high trading volatility banks are big banks. Seven out
of twelve banks have negative correlation between the banking and trading earnings.
However, only one of the correlations are statistically significant and there are two
other banks in Table 2.1 with significant positive correlations between the earnings.
This implies that the hedging story is weak. Further, both big and small banks have
positive and negative correlations.
Risk-adjusted excess trading return αT is estimated by Capital Asset Pricing
Model:
ROTt −Rf = αT + βT (RM −Rf ) + ε,
where βT is the trading beta coefficient, Rf is the quarterly 3-month treasury yield,
RM is the quarterly S&P 500 index return, and ε is a residual term. Table 2.1 gives




the trading beta and alpha estimates. Nine banks have positive beta estimates and
three of the estimates are statistically significant.22 Eight banks have positive trading
alphas and four of them are statistically significant. On the other hand, there are
also two banks with statistically significant negative trading alphas. Both of these
negative trading alpha banks are big banks. Clearly, all of our sample banks do not
benefit from the trading. Some of the alphas and betas are high, indicating that
some of the banks have lucrative activities (e.g. market making) and/or they use
leverage and/or derivative instruments. As explained in Table 2.1, the alphas are
bounded above by a technical condition (see footnote 18). In Subsections 2.5.6 and
2.5.7 we analyze the model behavior with respect to wide ranges of parameter values.
For instance, we show in Subsection 2.5.7 that the Volcker rule can raise the default
probability of a bank even under a small trading alpha.
When using the same method in estimating the banking alphas as we did with the
trading alphas, we find that all the banking alphas are negative over the time period
2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4. This is not due to the recent global financial crisis because these
estimates are similar for the 2000 Q1 – 2007 Q1 period. Note that if a bank’s forward
looking long-term banking alpha is negative then the bank should be liquidated,
unless banking has other purposes (such as collecting free government support that
can be utilized e.g. in trading; we do not model this) or a bank brings earnings
through recapitalization (we do not model this here but will model this in Chapter
III). Since we do not observe voluntary liquidations in our sample, we assume that
the forward looking alphas are non-negative. More specifically, we assume that all
the banks have the same strictly positive banking alpha. We find the forward looking
banking alpha by fitting the model equity value to the realized market equity value
22Note that we do not need the beta estimates since the expectation in (2.5) is under the risk-neutral probability.
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in the asset-weighted least squares sense and obtain αB = 0.38%. We analyze the
effect of this assumption on bank value, dividend policy, and default probability in
Section 2.5.
2.3.3 Cross-sectional Test and Comparative Statics
In Figure 2.1 we show that this model with the significant parameters explains
about 32% of the cross-sectional variation in the banks’ buffer capital ratios. Fur-
ther, the slope of the regression model is significant, indicating significant linear
relationship between the model and actual buffer capital levels. This is consistent
with Peura and Keppo (2006) who analyze a simpler model but a larger set of banks.
Thus, due to our small sample, Figure 2.1 just confirms the finding in that paper.
The model with the estimated parameters has a lower explanatory power.
Subsection 2.5.6 gives the comparative statics of the model under the median
model parameters. More specifically, figures in Subsection 2.5.6 analyze how the
value function (2.7d) and dividend barrier u change with respect to banking propor-
tion ζ, banking volatility σB, trading volatility σT , correlation between the banking
and trading earnings ρBT , banking alpha αB, trading alpha αT , risk-free rate r, and
wedge between debt and equity finance δ.
With these parameter values, the banking business has a higher risk adjusted
excess return than the trading business has and, therefore, the bank value rises in
the banking proportion (see Figure (2.3.1)). By the lower banking volatility, when
banking proportion rises then the earnings risk falls and, therefore, there is less
need for the hedging of future losses and the dividend barrier falls in the banking
proportion (see Figure (2.3.2)). The effect of banking and trading volatilities can be
explained in a similar way, because both of these volatilities increase the earnings
volatility. Since, by Lemma II.2, the value function is concave, the higher the earnings
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volatility the lower the value function (see Figures (2.3.3) and (2.3.5)). Further, the
higher the volatility the more the bank has to hedge its future losses and, thus, the
higher the dividend barrier (see Figures (2.3.4) and (2.3.6)). The earnings volatility
is the main driver of the dividend barrier: By Table 2.2, the earnings volatility and
dividend barrier have a correlation of 1.00 under the estimated parameters and 0.91
under the significant parameters (this is consistent with Peura and Keppo 2006).
Thus, our dividend policy is driven by risk management considerations.
The effect of correlation between the banking and trading cash flows is as expected
(see Figures (2.3.7) and (2.3.8)). The lower the correlation (and the more negative
it is), the higher the value function because then the hedging of banking cash flows
is more effective. Thus, in this case the earnings volatility falls and, by Lemma II.2,
the value function rises. To understand the effect of correlation on dividend policy,
we first note that we have two hedging methods for the banking cash flows. The
first is through trading and it requires negative correlation between the banking and
trading cash flows. The second is hedging with buffer capital and this is a substitute
for the first method. That is, if the bank is not able to hedge the banking cash flows
by trading then it raises its buffer capital so that it has more cushion for the future
losses. The buffer capital is increased by raising the dividend barrier and, therefore,
the dividend barrier rises in the correlation.
As expected, the value function is an increasing function of the banking and
trading alphas (see Figures (2.3.9) and (2.3.11)). However, the effect of the alphas
on the dividend barrier is not that straightforward (see Figures (2.3.10) and (2.3.12)).
This is because the alphas change the shape of the value function (see Figures (2.3.13)
and (2.3.14)): The lower the alphas, the more linear the value function. When alphas
rise then the value function becomes more concave and, thus, the bank becomes
24
more risk averse. This creates the need to hedge more and the dividend barrier
rises. However, when alphas are increased even more then their effect on increasing
earnings dominates and this decreases the need for hedging and the dividend barrier
falls.
The risk-free rate has both positive and negative effects on the equity value. First,
by (2.7a), the expected capital ratio rises in the risk-free rate and this increases the
equity value (relative to the assets). Second, by (2.7c), the discount rate increases
in the risk-free rate and this lowers the equity value. Figure (2.3.15) shows that,
similarly as with regular call options (rho of the call), the positive effect is stronger
and, thus, the equity value rises. The dividend barrier falls in the risk-free rate
(see Figure (2.3.16)), because then buffer capital increases faster and discounting is
stronger. When buffer capital rises then there is less need for hedging (so, u indeed
falls), and when there is more discounting then the value of future dividends decrease
and, thus, it is better to pay dividends sooner (u falls). The effect of the wedge
between debt and equity finance can be explained in a similar way. However, the
wedge affects only the discounting, not the buffer capital dynamics. Thus, by (2.7b),
the wedge has only the negative value effect of the risk-free rate and, therefore, the
value falls (see Figure (2.3.17)). Further, when the wedge rises the company prefers
to pay dividends earlier and, hence, the dividend barrier falls (see Figure (2.3.18)).
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2.4 Volcker rule
By using a sensitivity analysis with the estimated model parameters, we next
study our sample banks’ trading and estimate the impact of the Volcker rule. In
this we utilize Corollary II.5, i.e., if αT and ρBT are zero then it is optimal for the
bank not to trade. More specifically, we measure the value of each bank under four
different cases:
(i) Bank equity value without the Volcker rule: Value with the estimated param-
eter values and with only the statistically significant estimates in Table 2.1. That is,
we calculate two bank equity values for this case. In the first, αT and ρBT are equal
to their estimated values, and in the second, each parameter equals its estimated
value if the estimate is statistically significant at 5% significance level and otherwise
the parameter is zero. Note that, by Table 2.1, αT and ρBT are the only parameters
in Proposition II.3 that could be zero.
(ii) Bank equity value without trading alpha bets: Value with αT = 0, i.e., there
is no trading due to the excess return and, thus, by Proposition II.3 in this case the
banks trade only for hedging. As in (i), we calculate the bank equity values with all
the ρBT -estimates and also with only the significant correlations (the insignificant
correlations are set to zero).
(iii) Bank equity value without hedging: Value with ρBT = 0, i.e., there is no
correlation between the trading and banking returns, and, therefore, the banks trade
only for the excess return, not for hedging. As in (i), we calculate the bank eq-
uity values with all the αT -estimates and also with only the significant alphas (the
insignificant alphas are set to zero).
(iv) Bank equity without trading: Value with αT = 0 and ρBT = 0, i.e., by
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Corollary II.5 the banks do not trade at all.
In these cases we assume that only αT and ρBT change and all the other model
parameters are constant. Thus, for instance, we assume here that ζ is constant, i.e.,
the size of the banking book is independent of αT and ρBT . Further, in this section
we assume that if the trading is decreased then that money is invested in the risk-free
asset, not in the banking business. Comparing with the effect of optimal banking
fraction discussed in Subsection 2.3.2, the method of this section might give a more
positive trading effect because in our model the banking business generates a positive
alpha, although it is also risky.
The model estimated equity values under the four cases (i) − (iv) are in Table
2.2. The est. column is the bank equity with the estimated αT and ρBT parameter
values in Table 2.1 and the sig. column is with the significant parameters at 5%
significance level (non-significant αT and ρBT parameters are set to zero). We also
report percentage changes from the initial equity value (i) to each of the other equity
values (ii) − (iv), and calculate these changes with the estimated parameter values
and the significant parameters separately. These changes correspond to the value
impacts of the alpha bets, hedging, and trading overall. The difference between the
original bank equity value (i) and case (ii) gives the value change due to the alpha
bets. Similarly, the difference between (i) and (iii) is the equity value impact of
the hedging, and the difference between (i) and (iv) is the total equity value change
of trading. Depending on the implementation of the Volcker rule, the differences
between (i) and (ii) and between (i) and (iv) give the equity value decrease due
to the rule. Therefore, by Table 2.2, Volcker rule decreases on average bank equity
value between 14% (only significant parameters) and 20% (estimated parameters),
and thus about 17% is our estimate. The effect of banning alpha bets is about the
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same as banning all trading. Thus, the impact of hedging is on average about zero.
Further, as in Subsection 2.3.2, the Volcker rule penalizes big banks (BAC, JPM,
and WFC) less than typical banks in our sample due to the big banks’ unprofitable
trading (BAC and JPM, see Table 2.1) or lack of hedging (WFC).
As discussed earlier, in addition to the value changes in Table 2.2, the Volcker
rule might create significant compliance costs and we do not consider those in our
model.
2.4.1 Loan Prices
In this subsection we estimate how much banks should raise their loan rates to
compensate for the value decrease due to the Volcker rule. Since the rule prevents
banks from collecting trading alpha (or at least makes that harder and costly), banks
might focus more on the basic banking business. Therefore, we expect more inno-
vative banking products such as mortgages with insurances for real-estate risk (see
e.g. Fabozzi, Shiller, and Tunaru 2010). These products would allow banks to collect
higher fees and this way to increase their banking alphas.
We first estimate how much the banks should raise their banking alphas to com-
pensate the value decrease of the Volcker rule. After that we calculate the corre-
sponding increases in the loan rates that would give the new banking alphas if all
the other model parameters were fixed.23 Thus, this is a simple comparative statics
of the model. The increases in the loan rates can be viewed as a measure for new in-
novation and/or cost cutting that the banks need to do to justify the higher banking
alphas.
More specifically, we consider three scenarios (the first and the last are for the
23For instance, we saw this kind of behavior when the U.S. Congress limited the penalties on late payments of
credit cards. After the limitation credit card companies started collecting more fees from those people with sterling
credit (see e.g. New York Times, May 18th 2009, “Credit Card Industry Aims to Profit From Sterling Payers” by
Andrew Martin).
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Volcker rule). In the first, we assume that the Volcker rule allows hedging but not
the alpha bets. In this case we compare cases (i) and (ii), and find a new banking
alpha for case (ii) such that the bank equity value in (ii) equals the equity value in
(i). In the second case, hedging is prevented but not the alpha bets. In this case we
compare (i) and (iii) and estimate a new banking alpha for (iii) that produces the
same equity value as in (i). In the last case, we assume that the Volcker rule prevents
all trading (hedging and the alpha bets). Thus, in this case we compare (i) and (iv),
and calculate a new banking alpha in the same sense as with the other cases. The
new banking alphas are reported in Table 2.2. On average, the alpha bets would raise
the banking alpha by about 26 basis points (BPS) with the estimated parameters and
22 BPS with the significant parameters, the hedging by 1 BPS with the estimated
parameters and 0 BPS with the significant parameters, and total trading by about
26 BPS with the estimated parameters and 22 BPS with the significant parameters.
For the Volcker rule effect, we use the impact from the alpha bets and total trading.
Thus, by our comparative statics, banks should increase their banking alphas by
about 24 BPS to keep their equity value the same as before the rule. Big banks do
not need to raise their banking alphas because they are penalized the least by the
rule. As mentioned before, to get the higher banking alphas, banks need to create
new products and/or to improve their efficiency.
After we have the new banking alphas, we estimate the corresponding bank loan
margin changes. For this we analyze banking net income and assume here that
each bank’s NIBt equals the loan margin after default losses times the banking
assets, i.e., NIBt = mRWABt−1, where m is the loan margin and RWABt−1 is the
the banking assets at time t − 1. Thus, return on the banking assets is given by
NIBt/RWABt−1 = m. On the other hand, if we use the same return model as with
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the trading assets in subsection 2.3.2 then we have
NIBt
RWABt−1
= Rf + αB + β(RM −Rf ) + ε,
where β is the beta of the banking assets and we assume it is independent of αB.
Combining the two representations for banking asset returns, we get m = Rf +αB +
β(RM − Rf ) + ε, which gives ∆m = ∆αB. That is, the change in the loan margin
equals the banking alpha change. Thus, by Table 2.2, if the Volcker rule prevents
banks from trading or just from taking alpha bets then the banks should raise their
loan margins between zero and 1.62% (on average 24 BPS) to compensate the value
decreases from the Volcker rule. We expect that big banks have least pressure to
increase their loan margins; by our comparative statics, they do not need to raise the
loan rates at all (but many banks have to decrease their trading operations). Thus,
the effect of the Volcker rule on the loan margins is quite small. This is because,
based on our model and data, banks do not benefit much from the trading and most
of the banks’ assets are in the basic banking business. Therefore, a small increase in
the loan margins compensates the value fall due to the rule.
2.4.2 Default Probabilities
By (2.5), banks maximize their equity value, they do not necessary minimize their
default probability. Because banking regulators are in the business of minimizing the
default probability, banks and their regulators might have conflicting interests. For
instance, in 2008 during the recent financial crisis 21 large banks in the U.S. and
Europe paid total over $400 billion dividends which represents around one-third of
their 2007 market capitalization of $1.3 trillion (Acharya, Shin, and Gujral 2009).
The dividends lowered the banks’ capital and, therefore, their default probability
increased.
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In our model, a new regulation (or similarly a new portfolio constraint) cannot
increase the banks’ value because the rule sets constraints on their behavior. On the
other hand, regulation changes can increase or decrease the banks’ default proba-
bility. Unfortunately, it is not obvious what the effect on the default probability is
since banks react to regulation and this can cause positive and negative effects. This
is also the case with the Volcker rule.
If trading is profitable then ban on trading lowers the expected earnings and this
way also the expected buffer capital level. If also hedging is prevented then earnings
risk might increase. Both these effects may increase the default probability. On the
other hand, there is also a positive effect: Since Volcker rule prevents trading and, by
Table 2.1, trading earnings have a higher volatility than banking earnings have, the
total earnings volatility and this way also the default probability might fall. Thus,
the total effect on the default probability depends on the magnitude of the negative
and positive effects.24 Table 2.2 gives the effect of Volcker rule on the banks’ default
probability over 100 years, expected annual earnings, and earnings volatility. The
default probabilities are estimated by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths. By
Table 2.2, the change of the default probability from case (i) (i.e. without the Volcker
rule) to cases (ii)− (iv) (ban on alpha bets, hedging, and all trading; both estimated
and significant parameters) has correlation of -0.77 with the corresponding expected
earnings change and 0.05 with the corresponding earnings volatility change. Thus,
the expected earnings seem to drive the default probability as its correlation has a
higher absolute value.25 This implies that the best way to hedge default risk is to
run a profitable business. Note that, by Table 2.1, the Volcker rule prevents several
24Keppo et al. (2010) consider banks’ market risk requirement and, according to their model, the requirement has
similar effects on the default probability as the Volcker rule.
25Default probability does not necessarily increase in earnings volatility. By Figures (3.4.4) and (3.4.6) in Subsection
2.5.6, the dividend barrier rises in the volatility. Therefore, a low earnings volatility also means a low buffer capital
which could increase the default probability.
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banks to run their most profitable business.
The effect of Volcker rule on the default probability can be analyzed by comparing
the default probability in case (i) (without the rule) with cases (ii) (ban on alpha
bets) and (iv) (ban on all the trading). On average the Volcker rule increases the
default probability between 0.7% (with the estimated parameters) and 1.5% (with the
significant parameters) if only alpha bets are prevented, and between 0.8% (with the
estimated parameters) and 1.6% (with the significant parameters) if all the trading
is prevented. Thus, if the banks behave optimally according to our model then the
negative default effects of trading alpha and hedging are stronger than the positive
effect of a lower earnings volatility. As a result, the default probability of the banks
for the next 100 years increases on average by about half (from 2.3% to 3.4%). This
effect is mainly driven by four banks (CBSH, FHN, MTB, and STT). Their default
probabilities rise due to the Volcker rule under all cases (estimated parameters /
significant ones, ban on alpha bets / ban on all trading), and in this sense their
effect is robust. By Table 2.1, all the four banks have statistically significant positive
trading alphas and their value would rise if their trading operations were expanded.
Therefore, when trading is prevented, their expected profits fall (see column E(∆X)
in Table 2.2) and this lowers the buffer capital of the four banks, which raises the
default probability.
We analyze the robustness of these findings in Subsection 2.5.7 by using the
estimated parameters of FHN and MTB banks in Table 2.1. By Table 2.2, the
default probabilities of FHN and MTB both rise due to the Volcker rule. Within
the range of parameter values in the figures of Subsection 2.5.7, FHN has a higher
default probability under the Volcker rule as long as its trading alpha is positive and
banking volatility is higher than 0.1%. These two parameter scenarios indicate that
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the rule raises FHN’s default probability as long as the bank benefits from trading
relative to the banking business. Thus, the effect of Volcker rule on FHN’s default
probability is quite robust and it is not driven by the banks’ unusually high trading
alpha (it is enough that the alpha is positive). By Subsection 2.5.7, MTB’s default
probability rises due to the Volcker rule as long as the banking proportion is higher
than 98.5%, the correlation between trading and banking cash flows is lower than
0.4, trading volatility is lower than 2.4%, and trading alpha is over 2.2%. Thus,
similarly as with FHN, the parameter ranges for the correlation, trading volatility,
and the trading alpha imply that as long as there is enough trading value, the Volcker
rule raises the default probability. The parameter scenario of the banking book is
more complicated. By Figures (2.3.4) and (2.3.6) in Subsection 2.5.6, the dividend
barrier of case (ii) is lower than in case (i) due to the lower earnings volatility of case
(ii). When the banking proportion is higher than 98.5% then, by Figure (2.3.2) in
Subsection 2.5.6, the dividend barrier is even lower, raising the default probability
- especially in case (ii). This explains the rising default probability due to Volcker
rule when ζ > 98.5%.
We doubt the hedging story and its benefits. By Table 2.2, if the hedging is
prevented then the default probability falls by 0.08% (estimated parameters) and by
0.05% (significant parameters). This indicates that the banks do not focus on the
hedging of their default probability.
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2.5 Appendix for Chapter II
2.5.1 Model under the Objective Measure
Let us define the market return evolves as the following dynamics under the objective
measure P:
dM(t) = (r + λσM)M(t)dt+M(t)σMdW
P
M(t)
where W PM(t) is a Wiener process under P, λ is market price of risk and it is constant.
We can write this process in terms of WM(t), which is a Wiener process under the
risk-neutral probability measure, as follows





Under the risk-neutral probability,
dEB(t) = RW (t)ζ(r + αB)dt+RW (t)ζσBdWB(t),
where WB(t) = ρBMWM(t) +
√
1− ρ2BMW̃B(t), WM(t) and W̃B(t) are independent





1− ρ2BMW̃B(t) and this gives the following P-dynamics:
dEB(t) = RW (t)ζ(r + αB + σBλρBM)dt+RW (t)ζσBdW
P
B(t),




1− ρ2BMW̃B(t). The buffer capital ratio dynamics
(2.11a) can be written under P as follows
Xπ(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0










B(u) + (1− ζπ)θπ(u)σTdW PT (u)]− Lπ(t).
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2.5.2 Optimal Trading Strategy
Unconstrained optimal trading strategy
Let θ̃(x) denote an unconstrained optimal trading strategy at buffer capital level
x obtained from (2.11b) by the first order condition i.e.







If αT = 0 then θ̃(x) = − ζσBρBT(1−ζ)σT and θ
∗(x) = max{0,min(− ζσBρBT
(1−ζ)σT
, 1)}. Now
assume αT 6= 0.
Rearranging (2.16) we get
V ′′(x) = k1(θ̃(x))V
′(x) (2.17)
where k1(·) = − αT(1−ζ)σ2T (·)+ζσBρBT σT .
Inserting (2.17) into (2.11b) and then differentiating w.r.t. x. we come to
δV ′(x) =
[













σ2θk1(θ̃(x)) + (r + ζαB + (1− ζ)θ̃′(x)αT )
]
V ′′(x).
















k21(θ̃(x)) + (1− ζ)αT
(2.18)
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Initial Unconstrained Optimal Trading Weight θ̃(0)
θ̃(0) solves the following system of equations:
0 = 1
2
[ζ2σ2B + (1− ζ)2θ̃(0)2σ2T + 2ζσBρBT (1− ζ)θ̃(0)σT ]V ′′(0)
+[r + ζαB + (1− ζ)θ̃(0)αT ]V ′(0),







The first equation is from (2.11a) and (2.11b), and the second equation is (2.16)
at x = 0.
The second equation is equivalent to:
V ′(0) = −(1− ζ)σ
2
T θ̃(0) + ζσBσTρBT
αT
V ′′(0), (2.19)
if αT 6= 0. Substituting (2.19) into the first equation in the system and letting
θ̃0 = θ̃(0), we get
0 = −αT (1− ζ)2σ2T θ̃20 − 2(r + ζαB)(1− ζ)σ2T θ̃0 − 2(r + ζαB)ζσBσTρBT + αT ζ2σ2B.
By the quadratic formula and using the fact that if ρBT < 0 and αT > 0 then θ̃0 > 0
since V ′(0)/V ′′(0) < 0, we get
θ̃0 =
(r + ζαB)σT −
√




Constrained Optimal Trading Strategy θ∗(x)
By (2.18) and (2.20), we get
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((1− ζ)2θ̃(y)σ2T + ζσBρBT (1− ζ)σT )k1(θ(y))− 12σ
2
θ(1− ζ)σ2Tk1(θ(y)) + (1− ζ)αT
.







g(y)dy if αT 6= 0,
− ζσBρBT
(1−ζ)σT
if αT = 0.
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2.5.3 Model Parameters
Table 2.1: Sample Banks and Their Model Parameters over 2000 Q1-2011 Q4 .
Bank (Ticker) Risk-weighted Assets, m$ BC, % Vd, % ζd,% ζ,% σB ,% σT ,% ρBT αT ,% βT ,% u, %
(standard deviation) (standard deviation) est. sig. (standard error) (standard error) (standard error) est. sig.
ALLIANCE BANKSHARES 390 5.73 11.19 91.90 99.59 100.00 0.60 192.43 -0.43 615.81 ♦ -775.52 78.78 3.08
(ABVA) (50) (17.11) (0.18) (620.74) (1851.08)
BANK OF AMERICA 874,187 0.94 15.82 90.98 100.00 100.00 0.42 1.48 -0.24 -1.50 ∗∗ 4.92 ∗∗ 1.83 1.83
(BAC) (486,145) (2.22) (0.14) (0.47) (1.67)
COMMERCE BANCSHARES 13,011 4.23 23.05 99.88 97.05 75.00 0.14 12.47 -0.47 ∗∗ 55.36 ∗∗ 25.49 0.27 0.27
(CBSH) (632) (0.12) (0.12) (6.12) (21.75)
FIRST HORIZON 22,559 2.73 17.20 95.91 91.92 75.00 0.58 5.99 -0.08 21.02 ∗∗ 5.85 1.70 1.79
(FHN) (5,652) (2.64) (0.14) (2.26) (7.97)
HEARTLAND FINANCIAL 2,132 2.00 14.72 99.96 99.68 100.00 0.18 29.81 0.05 1.86 110.92 ∗∗ 0.53 0.53
(HTLF) (644) (0.05) (0.15) (10.62) (36.34)
JPMORGAN CHASE 827,965 1.37 14.83 74.17 100.00 100.00 0.26 0.76 -0.23 -1.23 ∗∗ 2.41 ∗∗ 0.72 0.72
(JPM) (319,811) (9.72) (0.14) (0.24) (0.84)
M & T BANK 46,239 0.09 19.89 99.54 83.75 83.75 0.17 1.89 0.31 ∗ 2.94 ∗∗ 3.85 0.49 0.49
(MTB) (14,500) (0.84) (0.13) (0.56) (1.98)
STATE STREET 53,943 6.80 35.27 99.27 98.77 98.53 0.95 63.35 0.17 264.73 ∗∗,♦ 68.80 3.56 3.21
(STT) (13,739) (1.33) (0.17) (88.86) (312.78)
SUNTRUST BANKS 133,965 0.81 13.88 97.16 100.00 100.00 0.36 1.88 0.23 -0.55 1.31 1.54 1.54
(STI) (26,138) (4.27) (0.14) (0.57) (2.02)
TOMPKINS FINANCIAL 1,472 3.94 25.11 98.63 100.00 100.00 0.14 1.28 -0.16 -1.18 -0.66 0.32 0.32
(TMP) (427) (1.56) (0.22) (0.76) (2.25)
WELLS FARGO 526,377 1.18 19.89 97.34 100.00 100.00 0.31 2.37 0.70 ∗∗ 0.34 3.98 1.53 1.24
(WFC) (333,883) (2.62) (0.09) (0.75) (2.63)
WINTRUST FINANCIAL 6,252 1.63 12.45 99.92 99.65 99.95 0.15 111.98 -0.28 467.18 -1323.96 0.23 0.37
(WTFC) (3,193) (0.17) (0.15) (231.90) (791.79)
Risk-weighted assets column is the average total risk-weighted asset size during the period in terms of million USD. BC denotes the mean buffer capital ratio. Vd is the average
market capitalization during the time period divided by the average risk-weighted asset during the time period (subscript d is for data, distincting from the model estimated
value). Parameter ζd is the time-series average of the ratio of banking assets to total assets, and ζ is the corresponding model optimal ratio (the lower bound ζI is 75%). The
column under est. is calculated with the trading alphas and correlations equal to their estimated values (the estimates are in this same table) while the column under sig. is
calculated with only the statistically significant trading alphas and correlations (the non-significant trading alphas and correlations are zero). Each bank’s estimated σB and
σT are the time-series annualized standard deviation of the banking and trading returns, and ρBT is the correlation between the banking and trading returns. One asterisk (
∗)
indicates the significance level of 5%, and two (∗∗) indicates 1%. Each bank’s αT and βT are the bank’s trading alpha (excess return) and trading beta coefficient. Diamond
symbol (♦) indicates the trading alpha values which violate the δ-condition in Subsection 2.3.2 (footnote 18), i.e., which have αT ≥ (δ − ζαB)/(1− ζ). We set these estimates
equal to αT = (δ − ζαB)/(1 − ζ) − ε where ε = 10−4. Therefore, we use the trading alpha value of 20.36% for ABVA and 222.72% for STT. u denotes the model estimated
dividend barrier. We find the forward looking banking alpha by fitting the model equity value to the realized market equity value in the asset-weighted least squares sense and
obtain αB = 0.38% (αB is the model implied value and it is the same for all the banks).
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2.5.4 Volcker Rule
Table 2.2: Effects of trading. (i) Base case is with the estimated parameters; (ii) is the case with trading alpha αT = 0; case (iii) is with ρBT = 0, i.e., zero correlation
between the banking and trading earnings; case (iv) is with zero ρBT and αT . V is the model bank equity value in terms of the risk weighted assets. ∆V/V is the value change
relative to the base case value. αB is a (new) banking alpha that gives the same bank equity value as in the base case. ∆αB is the difference between the base case αB and
the new αB . DP denotes the default probability during the next 100 years (by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths and time discretization ∆t = 1/365 a year). E(∆X)
and Std(∆X) are the annualized average and standard deviation of ∆X, respectively. u denotes the model estimated dividend barrier. The columns under est. are calculated
with the trading alphas and correlations equal to their estimated values in Table 2.1 while the columns under sig. are calculated with only the statistically significant trading
alphas and correlations (the non-significant trading alphas and correlations are zero).
Bank Cases V , % ∆V/V,% DP,% E(∆X), % Std(∆X), % αB ,% ∆αB ,% u,%
est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig.
ABVA (i) Base case 27.50 20.11 14.17 5.12 1.07 0.35 8.88 0.55 0.38 0.38 78.78 3.08
(ii) αT = 0 20.52 20.11 -25.38 0.00 4.17 5.12 0.35 0.35 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.38 0.14 0.00 2.67 3.08
(iii) ρBT = 0 26.10 20.11 -5.09 0.00 14.07 5.12 1.07 0.35 8.86 0.55 0.48 0.38 0.10 0.00 79.27 3.08
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 20.11 20.11 -26.87 0.00 5.12 5.12 0.35 0.35 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.38 0.15 0.00 3.08 3.08
BAC (i) Base case 16.26 16.26 3.16 3.16 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 1.83 1.83
(ii) αT = 0 16.38 16.26 0.71 0.00 2.77 3.16 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.75 1.83
(iii) ρBT = 0 16.26 16.26 0.00 0.00 3.16 3.16 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.83
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 16.26 16.26 0.00 0.00 3.16 3.16 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.83
CBSH (i) Base case 26.28 26.28 0.06 0.06 0.45 0.45 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.27 0.27
(ii) αT = 0 22.91 22.91 -12.84 -12.84 0.12 0.12 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.07 0.30 0.30
(iii) ρBT = 0 26.26 26.26 -0.10 -0.10 0.06 0.06 0.45 0.45 0.14 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.29
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 22.88 22.88 -12.94 -12.94 0.14 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.14 0.14 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.07 0.33 0.33
FHN (i) Base case 62.20 62.11 0.41 0.44 1.22 1.22 0.59 0.60 0.38 0.38 1.70 1.79
(ii) αT = 0 17.91 17.90 -71.21 -71.19 4.61 4.68 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.55 1.27 1.27 0.89 0.89 3.04 3.06
(iii) ρBT = 0 62.11 62.11 -0.15 0.00 0.44 0.44 1.22 1.22 0.60 0.60 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.79 1.79
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 17.90 17.90 -71.23 -71.19 4.68 4.68 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.55 1.27 1.27 0.89 0.89 3.06 3.06
HTLF (i) Base case 20.49 20.46 0.29 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.53
(ii) αT = 0 20.46 20.46 -0.15 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.53
(iii) ρBT = 0 20.50 20.46 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.53
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 20.46 20.46 -0.15 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.53
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Bank Cases V , % ∆V/V,% DP,% E(∆X), % Std(∆X), % αB ,% ∆αB ,% u,%
est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig. est. sig.
JPM (i) Base case 14.75 14.75 0.68 0.68 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.72 0.72
(ii) αT = 0 14.78 14.75 0.22 0.00 0.79 0.68 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.72
(iii) ρBT = 0 14.75 14.75 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.72
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 14.75 14.75 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.72
MTB (i) Base case 17.32 17.32 8.83 8.83 0.39 0.39 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.49
(ii) αT = 0 16.70 16.70 -3.56 -3.56 9.04 9.04 0.38 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.01 0.01 0.48 0.48
(iii) ρBT = 0 17.46 17.46 0.82 0.82 8.24 8.24 0.39 0.39 0.17 0.17 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.47
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 16.70 16.70 -3.56 -3.56 9.04 9.04 0.38 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.01 0.01 0.48 0.48
STT (i) Base case 103.24 103.59 0.51 0.47 2.00 2.00 1.11 1.05 0.38 0.38 3.56 3.21
(ii) αT = 0 19.61 19.61 -81.01 -81.07 14.49 14.49 0.38 0.38 0.94 0.94 2.00 2.00 1.62 1.62 6.06 6.06
(iii) ρBT = 0 103.59 103.59 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.47 2.00 2.00 1.05 1.05 0.37 0.38 -0.01 0.00 3.21 3.21
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 19.61 19.61 -81.01 -81.07 14.49 14.49 0.38 0.38 0.94 0.94 2.00 2.00 1.62 1.62 6.06 6.06
STI (i) Base case 17.63 17.63 2.13 2.13 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 1.54 1.54
(ii) αT = 0 17.63 17.63 0.00 0.00 2.13 2.13 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.54
(iii) ρBT = 0 17.63 17.63 0.00 0.00 2.13 2.13 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.54
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 17.63 17.63 0.00 0.00 2.13 2.13 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.54
TMP (i) Base case 22.36 22.36 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.32
(ii) αT = 0 22.36 22.36 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.32
(iii) ρBT = 0 22.36 22.36 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 22.36 22.36 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32
WFC (i) Base case 18.58 18.43 1.43 1.09 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.38 0.38 1.53 1.24
(ii) αT = 0 18.43 18.43 -0.81 0.00 1.09 1.09 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.24 1.24
(iii) ρBT = 0 18.86 18.43 1.46 0.00 1.18 1.09 0.38 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.37 0.38 -0.01 0.00 1.26 1.24
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 18.43 18.43 -0.81 0.00 1.09 1.09 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.24 1.24
WTFC (i) Base case 39.75 20.24 0.06 0.15 0.77 0.38 0.15 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.23 0.37
(ii) αT = 0 20.27 20.24 -49.01 0.00 0.17 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.14 0.15 0.77 0.38 0.39 0.00 0.35 0.37
(iii) ρBT = 0 39.68 20.24 -0.17 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.77 0.38 0.17 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.37
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 20.24 20.24 -49.07 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.15 0.15 0.77 0.38 0.39 0.00 0.37 0.37
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2.5.5 Buffer Capital
In this subsection, we illustrate how our model explains cross-sectional variation
in the banks’ buffer capital ratios (equity capital ratios above the minimum capital
level) before the Volcker rule. Figure 2.1 represents the actual capital buffer ratio
against the model predicted capital level taken to be the dividend barrier u in Table
2.1. This plot uses banks’ mean capital buffer ratios over 2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4 as the






























Figure 2.1: Actual vs. model buffer capital ratios for the sample banks. This figure
shows mean buffer capital ratios (during 2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4) plotted against the corresponding
model dividend barriers. The filled triangles are with the trading alphas and correlations equal to
their estimated values while the empty squares are with the statistically significant trading alphas
and correlations (the non-significant trading alphas and correlations are zero). Linear regression
lines are drawn in the figure. The numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations of
the parameters. Without the outlier (ABVA), the regression line for the estimated parameters is




Figure 2.2: Comparative Statics. We use the following median parameter values over all the
banks: ζ = 95%, r = 2%, δ = 2%, σB = 0.3%, σT = 4%, ρBT = −0.1, αB = 0.4%, αT = 0.4%,
δ = 2%, and x = 0.5%. Figures below show how the value function (2.7d) and dividend barrier u
change with respect to banking proportion ζ, banking volatility σB , trading volatility σT , correlation
between the banking and trading earnings ρBT , banking alpha αB , trading alpha αT , risk-free rate

































































































































































































































































(2.3.13) Value function and dividend barrier vs. buffer
capital under three banking alphas: 0.05% (lowest), 0.1%
(middle), and 0.3% (highest). The dotted vertical lines are





















(2.3.14) Value function and dividend barrier vs. buffer
capital under three trading alphas: 0.05% (lowest), 0.5%
(middle), and 5% (highest). The dotted vertical lines are
















































































Figure 2.3: Default probability changes with varying model parameters for Bank FHN.
We analyze two banks (FHN and MTB) and how their default probability changes with respect
to model parameters. We consider two cases: Case (i) is without the Volcker rule and case (ii) is
under the Volcker rule (no alpha bets). The first bank is FHN and we use its estimated parameters
in Table 2.1. Figures below show how the default probability changes with respect to banking
proportion ζ, risk-free rate r, correlation between the banking and trading earnings ρBT , wedge
between debt and equity finance δ, banking volatility σB , trading volatility σT , banking alpha αB ,




















Banking	  propor5on	  ζ,	  %	  
case	  (i)	  
case	  (ii)	  




















Adjusted	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  r-­‐μ,	  %	  
case	  (i)	  
case	  (ii)	  










































Wedge	  between	  debt	  and	  equity	  δ,	  %	  
case	  (i)	  
case	  (ii)	  
























Banking	  vola6lity	  σB	  ,	  %	  
case	  (i)	  
case	  (ii)	  



















Trading	  vola6lity	  σT	  ,	  %	  
case	  (i)	  
case	  (ii)	  













































(2.4.8) Default probability vs. trading alpha
Figure 2.4: Default probability changes with varying model parameters for Bank MTB.
The second bank is MTB and we use its estimated parameters in Table 2.1. Figures below show how
the default probability changes with respect to banking proportion ζ, risk-free rate r, correlation
between the banking and trading earnings ρBT , wedge between debt and equity finance δ, banking
volatility σB , trading volatility σT , banking alpha αB , and trading alpha αT .
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(2.5.8) Default probability vs. trading alpha
47
CHAPTER III
A Stochastic Control Model with Recapitalization
3.1 Model
We introduce a new model which considers a bank’s recapitalization process.26
Similar to our model presented in Chapter II, the new model is based on Milne and
Robertson (1996) and Keppo et al. (2010). The main differences between the two
models are as follows:
• Assets dynamics:
– In Chapter 3.1, we model total assets instead of risk-weighted assets27 as
in Chapter 2.1. This has some advantages and disadvantages. One of the
advantages is that we have reliable quarterly data for total assets from the
Compustat database while the data of risk-weighted assets are not available
in the same database. In addition, the method of applying different weights
to different types of assets in computing risk-weighted assets is unclear and
complicated to model. One disadvantage against using total assets may be
that it is not as informative as the risk-weighted assets.
– Although the assumption in Chapter 2.1 that the risk-weighted assets grows
26A bank has a motivation to buy back their shares when their prices decline considerably below their own
estimation in the market to increase the bank’s per-share earnings. Buybacks are under regulation by the Federal
Reserve since they can lower their buffer capital (see e.g. Wall Street Journal “Fed Wary of Bank Stock Buybacks.”)
27See footnote 5.
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at risk-free rate has an advantage of making the model simple to implement
numerically28, it lacks evidence supported by banks’ data. It is well-known
that assets equals shareholders’ equity plus debt. If we assume that assets
grows at a fixed rate while equity evolves stochastically, then we inevitably
and unwillingly make the assumption that this debt evolves stochastically.
Therefore, it is realistic to model assets as a stochastic variable of which
movement is correlated with that of the equity. Thus, we model assets by
a geometric brownian motion that has a correlation with the dynamics of
the shareholders’ equity in Chapter 3.1.
• A bank’s sources of earnings:
– In Chapter 2, a bank may collect earnings from net comprehensive income
i.e. earnings from banking and trading business as well as from interests
income on bank capital re-invested at a risk-free rate. However, we removed
the assumption that a bank earns interests on the bank capital as in Chap-
ter 3.1, and we assume that the net income earnings are strictly divided
into earnings from bank’s investments in banking assets and earnings from
trading.
– In Chapter 3.1, we incorporate a bank’s recapitalization (issuing and buy-
ing a bank’s own stock) into our model while we did not in Chapter 2.1.
Therefore, in the new model, a bank may have earnings not only from net
comprehensive income but also from recapitalization. This can be justified
by Table 3.2 as the estimates of net comprehensive recapitalization return
are positive for most banks. We assume that earnings through recapitaliza-
28This assumption enables us to obtain the ODE for the value function outside dividends in (2.11b) of which
coefficients do not depend on x, which makes solutions easily attainable.
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tion is proportion to the size of the bank i.e. total assets.
Besides these differences, our model in Chapter 2.1 takes a similar approach with
the previous model to solve the same optimization problem for banks.
3.1.1 A Model of Bank Capital
The bank operates up to liquidation. The liquidation time is defined as the first time
when equity hits minimum capital level:
τ = inf{t|X̄(t) ≤ 0}, (3.1)
where τ is the liquidation time and X̄(t) is the accounting shareholders’ equity above
the minimum level K ·A(t), K is a fixed ratio, e.g., the minimum capital requirement
of Basel regulation (see e.g. Peura and Keppo 2006). We use a minimum capital
level in our model calibration and set K equal to the minimum equity capital ratio
in our dataset.
We assume that earnings from the banking book and the trading book are pro-
portional to bank assets A(t). Banking book equals a fixed proportion of the assets
and the rest of the assets are in the trading book. Thus, the bank dedicates a cer-
tain fixed proportion of its assets to the basic banking business. We also assume
that the bank’s interest payments on its debt are deducted from the banking book.
The trading book consists of a liquid risky asset investment and a risk-free invest-
ment. The bank trades the assets in the trading book continuously without any
frictions. More specifically, the cumulative earnings processes under the risk-neutral
probability measure (see e.g. Bjork 2009) are given by
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= A(t) [ζ(r + αB)− r(1−K)] dt+ rX̄(t)dt+ A(t)ζσBdWB(t) (3.2)
dET (t) = A(t)(1− ζ)θ(t)(r + αT )dt+ A(t)(1− ζ)θ(t)σTdWT (t)
+A(t)(1− ζ)(1− θ(t))rdt
= A(t)(1− ζ)[r + θ(t)αT ]dt+ A(t)(1− ζ)θ(t)σTdWT (t), (3.3)
where EB(t) and ET (t) are the banking and trading book cumulative earnings at
time t, A(t) is the bank’s assets at time t, r is the risk-free rate, ζ is the constant
proportion of A(t) in the banking book and ζ ∈ [ζl, 1], ζl > 0 is the minimum size of
the banking book (so that the firm is still considered as a bank), θ(t) is the proportion
of the trading book invested in the liquid risky asset and θ(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0,
αB and αT are banking book and trading book alphas, σB and σT are banking book
and trading book volatilities and σB, σT > 0, WB(t) and WT (t) are Wiener processes
under the risk-neutral probability measure corresponding to EB and ET and their
correlation is ρBT .
Net banking income equals net banking earnings before interest payments on
debt minus the interest payments. The net banking earnings before the interest
payments are represented by the first two terms in (3.2), and the interests payments
are represented by the last term. Thus, we assume that the bank pays risk-free rate
for its debt29 and its banking business can earn excess return αB. The parameter
αB corresponds to high loan margins and returns on the bank’s loan portfolio. Note
that αT in (3.3) implies that the banks might be able to generate trading alpha. This
29By Compustat data, our sample banks’ (introduced in Section 3) pay about risk-free interest rate on their debt:
The interest rate on their debt and 3-month treasury bill rate have a correlation of 0.9 between 2000 and 2011.
Further, the average interest rate in that period is about 2% which is about the 3-month treasury bill rate over the
same time period.
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excess return could be, for instance, from market making or it just reflects the bank
shareholders’ expectation for the future returns.
We define a Wiener process WE(t) under the risk-neutral probability measure and
volatility σθ(t) corresponding to the total earnings of the bank as follows




ζ2σ2B + 2ζσBρBT (1− ζ)θ(t)σT + (1− ζ)2θ(t)2σ2T , (3.4)
and σθ(t) represents the volatility of the bank’s earnings. As we can see, the earnings
volatility depends on the asset quality: The more is invested in trading, the higher
the earnings volatility (typically, σT > σB). We assume the bank is able to control
θ(t) in continuous time. It can also choose ζ, but this parameter is constant. We do
not specify the trading and banking activities that create the alphas (excess returns
αB and αT ). In our model they are just alphas of the trading and banking books,
and in the model calibration we estimate the parameters from accounting and market
data.
By (3.2)-(3.4), the earnings of the bank follow
dE(t) = dEB(t)+dET (t) = A(t)
[







µθ(t) = r + ζαB + (1− ζ)θ(t)αT . (3.6)
Drift term µθ(t) represents proportional net income before interest payments on the
bank’s debt. Thus, the earnings depend on the asset size, the earnings parameters,
and the bank’s trading. The earnings are added to X̄(t), i.e., to the bank’s equity
capital above the minimum level.
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for some initial positive amount A(0), where µA is the constant percentage drift, σA
is the constant percentage volatility and σA > 0, WA(t) is a standard Wiener process
under the risk-neutral probability measure, and the correlation between WA(t) and
WE(t) is ρAE.
The bank’s capital also changes due to equity issuances and stock buybacks. For
this we define net recapitalization as equity issuance minus stock buybacks. We
assume that the cumulative net recapitalization follows
dR(t) = A(t)[µRdt+ σRdWR(t)]. (3.8)
where σR > 0 and WR(t) is a Wiener process under Q and it has correlations:
dWR(t)dWA(t) = ρRAdt and dWR(t)dWE(t) = ρREdt. Thus, asset dynamics and net
recapitalization processes are correlated (parameter ρRA) because changes in equity
due to the net recapitalization also changes the asset size. Parameter ρRE is due to
the fact that earnings process might tricker recapitalization and stock repurchases.
As expected, in our data (see Table 3.2) we have ρRA > 0 and ρRE < 0 (both of them
are significant at 5% level), i.e., when there is recapitalization then the asset size rises
and when earnings are low, banks sell equity. Equation (3.8) differs from the model
in Keppo et al. (2010) who do not consider stock buybacks but only equity issuances
when bank capital level is low. Since the correlation between recapitalization and
equity level is insignificant, we do not use the model in Keppo et al. (2010) in the
present paper. Naturally, the net recapitalization depends on many factors such as
taxes, equity level, earnings, bond market prices, and market liquidity, and we do
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not model here. Instead we use directly (3.8) and fit the net recapitalization process
to our data.
In addition to banking book size and trading risk, the bank controls its bank
capital through dividend payments that can be implemented instantaneously without
any costs. Formally, a capital control policy π̄ is a collection (ζ π̄, {θπ̄(t), Lπ̄(t)}),
where ζ π̄ is the proportion of total assets in the banking book under policy π̄, θπ̄(t)
is the proportion of trading book in the risky liquid asset at time t, and Lπ̄(t) is the
cumulative amount of dividends at time t. We denote by Π the class of admissible
policies and they satisfy:
(i) ζ π̄ ∈ [ζl, 1], where ζl > 0, and ζ π̄ is constant during the lifetime of the bank
(ii) θπ̄(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0 and it is adapted to Ft, where filtration {Ft} is
generated by the Wiener processes WA(t), WE(t), and WR(t).
(iii) Lπ̄t is a non-decreasing right-continuous process adapted to Ft and L
π̄
0− = 0.
Condition (i) indicates that the bank cannot change the proportion of the assets
in the banking book after it has selected that. Thus, the banking business is a long-
term investment with long-term commitments. By (ii), short selling is not allowed
and the bank cannot invest more than its trading book in the risky asset. Condition
(iii) says that dividends cannot be negative.
Bank capital as a function of policy π̄ is denoted by X̄ π̄(t) and, by (3.5) and (3.8),
it satisfies:




















A(u)[µRdu+ σRdWR(u)]− Lπ̄(t). (3.9)
The integral terms are the gains and losses from the trading and banking books and
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the changes of equity due to the net recapitalization. The last term is the cumulative
dividend process. Thus, cumulative profits and equity issuances feed to the capital,
while dividend payments, cumulative losses, and stock buybacks represent a leakage
from the capital.
By risk-neutral pricing, the market value of bank equity is the expected discounted
dividends until liquidation. Thus, the equity value under policy π̄ and initial account-







where E is expectation under the risk-neutral probability measure, δ is a positive
constant representing the wedge between debt and equity finance due to capital
market frictions such as taxation and agency costs of equity.30 The wedge satisfies
δ > max[αB, αT , µR−r], which gives V̄π̄(x̄) <∞. Thus, the wedge δ should be greater
than any of the returns from banking, trading, or net recapitalization in excess of
risk-free rate. The problem is to identify the value of an optimally managed bank:
V̄ (x̄) = sup
π̄∈Π
V̄π̄(x̄) (3.11)
and an admissible policy which achieves this value.
3.1.2 A Normalized Model of Bank Capital Ratio
The capital dynamics defined in (3.9) are not time-homogenous, which makes direct
solution of the problem (3.11) difficult. However, the problem of capital control can
be transformed into a time-homogenous problem of capital ratio control through a
simple normalization. The normalized state variable, the bank capital ratio is given
by
X(t) = X̄(t)/A(t). (3.12)
30Since our modeling framework is under the risk-neutral probability measure δ should not be interpreted as an
equity risk premium.
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From Peura and Keppo (2006) we get the following lemma that presents the capital
ratio control problem and shows its connection to the capital control problem (3.11).















[Xπ(u) +K][(µA − σ2A)du+ σAdWA(u)]. (3.13a)
Define the liquidation time by
τπ = inf{t|Xπ(t) ≤ 0} (3.13b)










where the expectation is conditional on the capital ratio dynamics (3.13a). The value
function:
V (x) = sup
π∈Π
Vπ(x). (3.13d)
Then (3.11) can be expressed in terms of (3.13d) as
V̄ (X̄(0)) = A(0)V (X(0)). (3.14)
Further, let π∗ be the policy which achieves the optimum in (3.13d). Then the optimal


















Hence, when π and π̄ are related through (3.15) then the capital ratio process
(3.13a) is the process of X̄ π̄(t)/A(t). The proof is based on Ito’s lemma and equations
(3.5) and (3.7). Equation (3.14) implies that the objective function of the capital
ratio control problem, (3.13d), can be interpreted as the market value of bank equity
as a percentage of the total assets.
From Højgaard and Taksar (2004) we get the following lemma.
Lemma III.2. (Concavity) The value function in (3.13d) is increasing and concave.
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3.2 Characterization of Optimum
We characterize the value function (3.13d) through a set of variational inequalities.
For this purpose we define the infinitesimal generator A corresponding to (3.13a) for











−(x+K)σA(σRρRA + σθρAE)f ′′(x)
+[µθ − r + µR − (x+K)(µA − r)]f ′(x). (3.16)
Further, let us write the value function corresponding to banking proportion ζ ∈
[ζl, 1] as V
ζ(x). That is, V ζ(x) is the expected discounted dividends in (3.13c) and
(3.13d) for given ζ.
Now we get the following proposition. The proof follows from standard arguments
(see e.g. Højgaard and Taksar 1999 or Fleming and Soner 2005).
Proposition III.3. (Value function) The value function corresponding to banking
book proportion ζ ∈ [ζl, 1] solves
LIQUIDATION: V ζ(0) = 0 (3.17a)
LIQUID ASSET INVESTMENT: max
θ∈[0,1]





= 1 for all x ≥ u (3.17c)


















For each buffer capital ratio x, one of the inequalities (3.17b) - (3.17c) is tight.
The numerical solution for (3.18) is given in Appendix 3.5.2. The optimal policy
can be understood as follows. Dividends are paid so as to never let the capital ratio
rise above u, and between the dividend payments the bank invests actively in the
risky financial asset. The optimal trading strategy solves max(Aθ − λ)V ζ(x) = 0.
Note that, by (3.16) and Lemma III.2, (Aθ − λ)V ζ(x) is concave with respect to
θ ∈ [0, 1] and, thus, the first order condition gives the optimal trading strategy
θ∗. The term − ζσBρ
(1−ζ)σT








is from the alpha of the trading
strategy. The hedging term has its maximum value when the correlation equals −1,
and the alpha term is increasing in the alpha of the trading, αT . Note that hedging
increases value because, by Lemma III.2, the value function is concave and hedging
decreases volatility. The max and min functions in the equation for θ∗(x) are due to
the trading constraint.
Proposition III.3 follows from standard dynamic programming arguments applied
to the Bellman equation. By (3.17a), when the capital ratio hits zero the bank is
liquidated. The slope condition at the dividend barrier (3.17c) and the differen-
tial equation between the dividend times (3.17b) hold since paying dividends and
trading are always admissible. We note that the smooth pasting and the super con-
tact conditions are required for V ζ at the dividend barrier, i.e., ∂V
ζ(x)
∂x
|x=u = 1 and
∂2V ζ(x)
∂x2
|x=u = 0 (see Dumas 1991).
In case of nonzero correlation between the banking and trading earnings, the value
function in Proposition III.3 has to be solved numerically.31 If the correlation is zero,
i.e., ρ = 0 then we get the model in Keppo et al. (2010). Further, note that if ζ = 1
31We use a standard finite difference approximation method to solve the value function (see e.g. Kushner and
Dupuis 2000, Section 5.1) and implemented the method in Matlab.
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then the bank invests all the wealth in the banking business and, therefore, the value
function is independent of trading since then there are no trading assets. In this case
the model equals Peura and Keppo (2006). For ζ ∈ [ζl, 1), the smooth pasting and
the super contact conditions with Lemma III.2 lead to an explicit formula for the
value function (3.17) at the dividend barrier u:
Lemma III.4. (Value at dividend barrier) Let τ > 0, αT > 0, σT 6= 0, and ζ ∈ [ζl, 1).
Then the value function at the dividend barrier is given by
V ζ(u) =
ζαB + (1− ζ)αT + µR − (u+K)(µA − r)
λ
(3.19)
and θ∗(u) = 1, i.e., the bank has the maximum position in the liquid risky asset at
the barrier. If the above conditions hold, except if we have αT ≤ 0, then
V ζ(u) =
ζαB + µR − (u+K)(µA − r)
λ
. (3.20)
Further, if αT = 0 then θ
∗(u) = max{0,min[1,− ζσBρ
(1−ζ)σT
]}, and if αT < 0 then
θ∗(u) = 0, i.e., then the bank has the minimum position in the liquid risky asset at
the barrier.
Proof: By (3.17b) and the value matching, smooth pasting, and super contact con-
ditions at uD, we have
V ζ(u) = sup
θ(u)∈[0,1]
[(ζαB + (1− ζ)θ(u)αT + µR − (u+K)(µA − r))/λ].




]}. Second, if αT > 0 then θ∗(u) = 1 and (3.19) follows.
Finally, if αT < 0 then θ
∗(u) = 0 and (3.20) follows.

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By Lemma III.4, the value function at the dividend time is given by the simple
equations (3.19) and (3.20) which do not include any volatilities or correlations.
However, the dividend barrier u (solved by the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions) and, therefore, also the dividend time depend on the volatilities and the
correlations.
From (3.18) we get the following corollary.
Corollary III.5. (Trading) If the trading alpha and the correlation between the
banking and trading cash flows are both zero then the bank does not trade. That is,
if αT = 0 and ρ = 0 then θ
∗(x) = 0 for all x ∈ (0, u].
This result implies that there are two motivations for trading: alpha generating
bets and the hedging of banking earnings. When the trading alpha and the correla-
tion are zero then there is no trading. In this case our model is given by Peura and
Keppo (2006).
So far we have analyzed the value function with given banking book size ζ ∈ [ζl, 1].
Next we discuss about the optimal ζ and for this we define Υx(ζ) = V ζ(x), where x
is the buffer capital at time 0. The optimal ζ is solved at time 0 and it is constant:
ζ∗ = arg maxζ∈[ζl,1]Υ
x(ζ). By the extreme value theorem, Υ attains its maximum on
[ζl, 1]. The maximum value is either at a local maximum in (ζl, 1), or at a boundary
(ζl or 1), i.e., at the point where the derivative is zero or at a boundary. We solve ζ
numerically by testing these candidates.
Note that if ζ was time varying then we would solve that from (3.17b) similarly
as θ∗ in Proposition III.3. This would give ζ = max(ζl,min(1, ζ̂)) where
ζ̂ =
(θαT − αB)σθ










where, by Lemma III.2, the first term besides θαT − αB and (σθ + σRρRE − (x +
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K)σAρAE) is negative. This implies that the higher the banking alpha relative to the
trading alpha, the bigger the banking book size is. Since typically σT > σB, the last
term is positive if θ ≥ ρ.
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3.3 Model Calibration
In this section we calibrate our model to twelve U.S. banks during 2000 Q1 –
2011 Q4. This period was selected to include the most current period after the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act on late 1999.32 We use the twelve banks because
for them we have required accounting data for our analysis over this time period
from the Compustat Database.33 We estimate the model parameters by using the
in-sample data on the banks. The period is divided into in-sample and out-of-sample
periods: 2000 Q1 – 2009 Q4 is the in-sample period and 2010 Q1- 2011 Q4 is the
out-of-sample period. We also use the banks’ stock price and shares outstanding
from CRSP for the market value of shareholders’ equity (the shares outstanding are
used with the model’s market capitalization), the yield on 3-month U.S. treasury bill
for the risk-free interest rate, and the S&P 500 index for the market portfolio.
3.3.1 Banks
The banks are introduced in Table 3.1. As we can see, the banks’ average total
assets during the time period vary from below three billion USD (ABVA, HTLF,
and TMP) to over 500 billion USD (BAC, JPM, and WFC). The big banks have
smaller buffer capital ratios than the small banks have: The correlation between the
mean buffer capital ratio and the mean asset size is -0.10. This is consistent with
the “too big to fail” concept since if the big banks know that they are so large and
so interconnected that their failure would be disastrous to the economy, and which
therefore must be supported by government when they face difficulty, then it might
be optimal for the big banks to maximize the value of the bailout option by running
32Glass-Steagall Act limited commercial banks’ security activities and affiliations between commercial banks and
securities firms.
33Compustat data variables include: total assets, trading account securities, federal funds sold and securities
borrowed or purchased under agreements to resell, interest income and expense on federal funds sold and securities
borrowed or purchased under agreements to resell comprehensive income, net gain (loss) from trading securities, tier
1 capital ratio, and shareholders’ equity.
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their business with a low buffer capital ratio.34 However, given the model parameters
(that might, at least partially, be driven by the above discussed moral hazard), seven
banks (CBSH, FHN, HTLF, JPM, STT, TMP, and WTFC) have higher mean buffer
capital ratios than our model dividend barriers (both under estimated parameters
and under the significant parameters, columns under u in Table 3.1.). Thus, these
banks run their business with higher capital buffers than what is optimal according
to our model (the seven banks include both small and big banks) and, therefore,
each of these banks has a lower default probability than the corresponding optimally
managed bank has. However, the banks might have too high earnings volatility due
to the moral hazard problem discussed above and they might have too much leverage
because the banks pay low interest rates for their own debt due to the government
support (we do not model the government support). Higher earnings volatility and
leverage naturally increase the risks of the whole industry.
Most of the bank assets are in the basic banking business, eleven banks have over
90% of their assets in the banking book. Only JPM has less than 80% of their assets
in the banking book. For all the banks, the banking earnings volatility is lower than
their trading volatility. This is consistent with DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh
(2004, 2006), and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who find that movement away from
traditional banking activities toward other financial services increases the volatility
and market risk. Seven banks had negative correlation between the banking and
trading earnings. Negative correlation implies partial hedging of the basic banking
business. Seven banks out of twelve had higher trading alpha (excess return) than
the banking alpha. Some of the trading alphas are too high for forward looking
estimates. However, as explained in Table 3.1, the alphas are bounded above by a
34For more on this, see e.g. Haldane and Alessandri (2009) and Miles et al. (2012).
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technical condition and our model parameters are the 2000 Q1 - 2011 Q4 sample
estimates. We do not know specifically which activities create their trading alphas.
For instance, many banks have profitable market making of which return on capital
can be high35, and during our sample time period many banks placed a lot of assets
that looked as a banking book-type into the trading book (e.g. CDO tranches),
possibly to take advantage of trading book’s lower capital requirements. Further,
many high trading alpha banks have high trading volatilities and, by the concavity
of the value function (Lemma III.2), our model bank might prefer not to invest
in the trading. To understand better the effect of different model parameters, in
Subsections 3.5.6 and 3.5.7 we analyze the model behavior with respect to wide
ranges of parameter values. For instance, we show in Subsection 3.5.7 that the
Volcker rule can raise the default probability of a bank even under a small trading
alpha. In the next subsection we explain the parameter estimation.
3.3.2 Discrete Model for Equity Ratio
In this subsection, we estimate parameters by comparing our continuous model
with the corresponding discrete model and matching their first and second moments.
For this, we need to write our model under the objective measure P to estimate
parameters from real data. This is done in Subsection 3.5.1.
The accounting identity that governs the evolution of bank’s shareholders’ equity
is of the form
Ct = Ct−1 +NIt −Dt + St (3.21)
where Ct is bank’s shareholders’ equity at time t, NIt is net (comprehensive) income
over period (t−1, t), Dt is total dividend payments over period (t−1, t), each payment
35For instance, Morgan Stanley posted net trading gains every day during the second quarter of 2007 and Goldman
Sachs had only 11 losing days in their trading between April 2009 and April 2010 (see e.g. Bloomberg, May 13th
2010, “Rigged-Market Theory Scores a Perfect Quarter” by Jonathan Weil).
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made at discrete finite times, and St is net recapitalization over period (t− 1, t). For
the net recapitalization, we use the change in the sum of common and preferred
capital plus capital surplus/share premium minus treasury capital. Note that (3.21)
is consistent with our continuous time model (3.9).
Let Bt denote the bank’s shareholders’ equity above the minimum capital require-
ment K · At at time t i.e. Bt = Ct −K · At, and Xt = Bt/At the bank buffer equity




























































































































Similarly, we obtain the expectation and variance of dX under the objective mea-
sure P according to (3.25) as follows:
E[dX] = [µθ − σθ(σAρAE − λρM)− r(1− (K + E[X])]dt− E[dL̃]
+[µR − σR(σAρRA − λρSM)]dt− (E[X] +K)(µA − σ2A + λσAρAM)dt












In comparison between (3.22) and (3.22), we estimate parameters in the continu-
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+ σ2A − λσAρAM . (3.23)
The estimates for λ, ρAM , ρSM , ρM are given in Table 3.1.
3.3.3 Model Parameters for Net Income Earnings
Now we estimate the parameters for the dynamics of net (comprehensive) income
earnings. The total assets At is the sum of banking assets ABt and trading assets
ATt:
At = ABt + ATt.
Similarly as with the assets, total net comprehensive income NIt over period (t−1, t]
is the sum of banking net comprehensive incomeNIBt and trading net comprehensive
income NITt over the same period:
NIt = NIBt +NITt.
For the trading revenues we use the gain (loss) of trading/dealing securities in Com-
pustat. However, to get trading net income (NITt) from the trading revenues we
subtract 50% for compensation and infrastructure costs from all (positive) gains.
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This is consistent with the compensation at several leading banks.36 We analyze the
effect of this assumption in Subsections 3.5.6 and 3.5.7 by varying the trading alpha
parameter. For the banking net income (NIBt) we use Compustat’s net income
(NIt) minus the trading net income (NITt).
We define banking return on assets, ROBt, and trading return on assets, ROTt,








In other words, the returns are computed by dividing the net income of year t by
the corresponding assets in the previous year (t− 1).37
Volatilities σB and σT are estimated as the annualized standard deviations of the
time series {ROBt} and {ROTt}, respectively. Parameter ρBT is the correlation




}. Volatilities and correlations are in Table
3.1. Most of the volatilities are less than 5%, but there are four banks with over 5%
annual trading volatility (FHN, HTLF, JPM, and WTFC). Ten out of twelve banks
have negative correlation between the banking and trading earnings. However, only
two of the correlations are statistically significant and there is another bank in Table
3.2 with significant positive correlations between the earnings. This implies that the
hedging story is weak. Further, both big and small banks have positive and negative
correlations.
Risk-adjusted excess trading return αT is estimated by Capital Asset Pricing
Model:
ROTt −Rf = αT + βT (RM −Rf ) + ε,
36See e.g. Boston.com, January 22nd 2010, “Goldman earns record $4.79B in Q4, cuts bonus pool” by Stevenson
Jacobs,
http://articles.boston.com/2010-01-22/business/29306629_1_proprietary-trading-bank-financial-crisis
37We use Compustat variables as follows: AT = trading securities, AB = total assets - AT, NIT = max(0.5*net
gain in trading, 0) + min(net gain in trading, 0), and NIB = net income - NIT.
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where βT is the trading beta coefficient, Rf is the quarterly 3-month treasury yield,
RM is the quarterly S&P 500 index return, and ε is a residual term. Table 3.2 gives
the trading alpha and beta estimates. Nine banks have positive beta estimates and
two of the estimates are statistically significant.38 Five banks have positive trading
alphas and four of them are statistically significant. On the other hand, there are also
seven other banks with statistically significant negative trading alphas. Clearly, all
of our sample banks do not benefit from the trading. Some of the alphas and betas
are high, indicating that some of the banks have lucrative activities (e.g. market
making) and/or they use leverage and/or derivative instruments. As we will see in
Section 3.4, the Volcker rule can raise the default probability of a bank even under
a small trading alpha.
When using the same method in estimating the banking alphas, i.e. banking
excess return prior to the interest payments on debt, as we did with the trading
alphas, we use the time series for banking return ROBt plus the time series for the
interest payments divided by total assets It minus on debt minus the risk-free return
on the RHS as follows
(ROBt + It)−Rf = αB + βT (RM −Rf ) + ε,
where βB is the banking beta coefficient. Table 3.2 gives the banking alpha and
beta estimates. we find that all the banking alphas are negative over the time period
2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4. This is not due to the recent global financial crisis because
these estimates are similar for the 2000 Q1 – 2007 Q1 period. In theory, a bank
should be liquidated if a bank’s banking alpha is negative, which is not the case in
reality. That means, all sample banks rely on their earnings from trading business or
net recapitalization. Not surprisingly, nine banks have positive net recapitalization
38Note that we do not need the beta estimates since the expectation in (6) is under the risk-neutral probability.
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return on assets.
We estimate the wedge between debt and equity finance, δ as the implied solution
by fitting the model equity ratio value to the realized market equity ratio. We com-
pute such δ once with estimated parameters or once with significant parameters.39
Although the banking proportion ζ is optimized in our model, we also estimate
it from our data. We find the best-fitting implied ζ for the equations (3.6) and
(3.4) by using the estimates of σθ and µθ computed as in (3.23). We assume that
r = 2% as it is close to the average of risk-free rate over our sample period. We
denote the solution of the system above by ζd, which is given in Table 3.1. Note that
θ(t) = 1 for convenience above. Using ζd requires us to modify the constraint on the
wedge δ given in Section 1 to δ > max[ζdαB + (1 − ζd)αT , µR]. None of our sample
banks have parameter estimates which violate this constraint. Further, note that ζ
is constant in our model, i.e., the banking asset size is a long term strategic decision
and, therefore, the observed ζd in Table 3.1 is not the same as the current optimal
ζ. In fact, If we set ζI = 75%, which is close to the minimum ζd in Table 3.1 (JPM),
the model’s optimal allocation in the banking business is at 75% or the minimum
banking proportion possible. In other words, according to our model, the equity
value of all sample banks would rise if the size of their trading units was increased.
However, note that here we simply assume that the trading business could keep its
profitability when it is expanded, which may not be the case.
3.3.4 Cross-sectional Test and Comparative Statics
In Figure 3.2 we show that our model explains about 34% of the cross-sectional
variation in the banks’ maximum buffer capital ratios. Further, the slope of the
regression model is significant, indicating significant linear relationship between the
39See columns under δ in Table 3.1
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model and actual buffer capital levels. This is consistent with Peura and Keppo
(2006) who analyze a simpler model but a larger set of banks. Thus, due to our
small sample, Figure 3.2 just confirms the finding in that paper.
Subsection 3.5.6 gives the comparative statics of the model under the median
model parameters. More specifically, figures in Subsection 3.5.6 analyze how the
value function (3.13d) and dividend barrier u change with respect to banking propor-
tion ζ, banking volatility σB, trading volatility σT , correlation between the banking
and trading earnings ρBT , banking alpha αB, trading alpha αT , risk-free rate r, and
wedge between debt and equity finance δ.
With these parameter values, the banking business has a higher risk adjusted ex-
cess return than the trading business has and, therefore, the bank value rises in the
banking proportion (see Figure (3.4.1) in Subsection 3.5.6). By the lower banking
volatility, when banking proportion rises then the earnings risk falls and, therefore,
there is less need for the hedging of future losses and the dividend barrier falls in the
banking proportion (see Figure (3.4.2)). The effect of banking and trading volatil-
ities can be explained in a similar way, because both of these volatilities increase
the earnings volatility. Since, by Lemma III.2, the value function is concave, the
higher the earnings volatility the lower the value function (see Figures (3.4.3) and
(3.4.5)). Further, the higher the volatility the more the bank has to hedge its future
losses and, thus, the higher the dividend barrier (see Figures (3.4.4) and (3.4.6)).
The earnings volatility is the main driver of the dividend barrier: By Table 3.2, the
earnings volatility and dividend barrier have a correlation of 1.00 under the esti-
mated parameters and 0.91 under the significant parameters (this is consistent with
Peura and Keppo (2006)). Thus, our dividend policy is driven by risk management
considerations.
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The effect of correlation between the banking and trading cash flows is as expected
(see Figures (3.4.7) and (3.4.8)). The lower the correlation (and the more negative
it is), the higher the value function because then the hedging of banking cash flows
is more effective. Thus, in this case the earnings volatility falls and, by Lemma III.2,
the value function rises. To understand the effect of correlation on dividend policy,
we first note that we have two hedging methods for the banking cash flows. The
first is through trading and it requires negative correlation between the banking and
trading cash flows. The second is hedging with buffer capital and this is a substitute
for the first method. That is, if the bank is not able to hedge the banking cash flows
by trading then it raises its buffer capital so that it has more cushion for the future
losses. The buffer capital is increased by raising the dividend barrier and, therefore,
the dividend barrier rises in the correlation.
As expected, the value function is an increasing function of the banking and
trading alphas (see Figures (3.4.9) and (3.4.11)). However, the effect of the alphas
on the dividend barrier is not that straightforward (see Figures (3.4.10) and (3.4.12)).
This is because the alphas change the shape of the value function (see Figures (3.4.13)
and (3.4.14)): The lower the alphas, the more linear the value function. When alphas
rise then the value function becomes more concave and, thus, the bank becomes
more risk averse. This creates the need to hedge more and the dividend barrier
rises. However, when alphas are increased even more then their effect on increasing
earnings dominates and this decreases the need for hedging and the dividend barrier
falls.
The adjusted risk-free rate has both positive and negative effects on the equity
value. First, by (3.13a), the expected capital ratio rises in the adjusted risk-free rate
and this increases the equity value (relative to the assets). Second, by (3.13c), the
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discount rate increases in the adjusted risk-free rate and this lowers the equity value.
Figure (3.4.13) shows that, similarly as with regular call options (rho of the call),
the positive effect is stronger and, thus, the equity value rises. The dividend barrier
falls in the adjusted risk-free rate (see Figure (3.4.14)), because then buffer capital
increases faster and discounting is stronger. When buffer capital rises then there is
less need for hedging (so, u indeed falls), and when there is more discounting then the
value of future dividends decrease and, thus, it is better to pay dividends sooner (u
falls). The effect of the wedge between debt and equity finance can be explained in a
similar way. However, the wedge affects only the discounting, not the buffer capital
dynamics. Thus, by (3.13b), the wedge has only the negative value effect of the
adjusted risk-free rate and, therefore, the value falls (see Figure (3.4.15)). Further,
when the wedge rises the company prefers to pay dividends earlier and, hence, the
dividend barrier falls (see Figure (3.4.16)).
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3.4 Volcker Rule
By using a sensitivity analysis with the estimated model parameters, we next
study our sample banks’ trading and estimate the impact of the Volcker rule. In
this we utilize Corollary III.5, i.e., if αT and ρBT are zero then it is optimal for the
bank not to trade. More specifically, we measure the value of each bank under four
different cases:
(i) Bank equity value without the Volcker rule: Value with the estimated param-
eter values and with only the statistically significant estimates in Table 3.2. That is,
we calculate two bank equity values for this case. In the first, αT and ρBT are equal
to their estimated values, and in the second, each parameter equals its estimated
value if the estimate is statistically significant at 5% significance level and otherwise
the parameter is zero. Note that, by Table 3.1, αT and ρBT are the only parameters
in Proposition III.3 that could be zero.
(ii) Bank equity value without trading alpha bets: Value with αT = 0, i.e., there
is no trading due to the excess return and, thus, by Proposition III.3 in this case the
banks trade only for hedging. As in (i), we calculate the bank equity values with all
the ρBT -estimates and also with only the significant correlations (the insignificant
correlations are set to zero).
(iii) Bank equity value without hedging: Value with ρBT = 0, i.e., there is no
correlation between the trading and banking returns, and, therefore, the banks trade
only for the excess return, not for hedging. As in (i), we calculate the bank eq-
uity values with all the αT -estimates and also with only the significant alphas (the
insignificant alphas are set to zero).
(iv) Bank equity without trading: Value with αT = 0 and ρBT = 0, i.e., by
74
Corollary III.5 the banks do not trade at all.
In these cases we assume that only αT and ρBT change and all the other model
parameters are constant. Thus, for instance, we assume here that ζ is constant, i.e.,
the size of the banking book is independent of αT and ρBT . Further, in this section
we assume that if the trading is decreased then that money is invested in the risk-free
asset, not in the banking business.
3.4.1 Bank Value
The model estimated equity values under the four cases (i)− (iv) are in Table 3.3.
We also report percentage changes from the initial equity value (i) to each of the
other equity values (ii)− (iv).These changes correspond to the value impacts of the
alpha bets, hedging, and trading overall. The difference between the original bank
equity value (i) and case (ii) gives the value change due to the alpha bets. Similarly,
the difference between (i) and (iii) is the equity value impact of the hedging, and the
difference between (i) and (iv) is the total equity value change of trading. Depending
on the implementation of the Volcker rule, the differences between (i) and (ii) and
between (i) and (iv) give the equity value decrease due to the rule.
By Table 3.3, Volcker rule decreases on average bank equity value by 1% in the
assets-weighted sense. The effect of banning alpha bets is about the same as banning
all trading. Thus, the impact of hedging is on average about zero.
To analyze the robustness of our results further, we create a fictitious bank with
trading model parameters as follows: r = 3%, αT = 3.5% and σT = 3.03%. These
parameter values are consistent with the hedge fund parameter estimates in Ang,
Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Getmansky, Lo,
and Makarov (2004), Wermers (2003), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997), Carhart (1997), Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), and Kosowski,
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Naik, and Teo (2007). The other model parameters are equal to the median es-
timates of the corresponding parameters in our sample data: ζ = 98%, σB = 0.65%,
ρBT = −0.09, muA = 11.69%, σA = 10.75%, ρAE = 0.01, µR = 0.68%, αB =
0.56%, ρRA = 0.48, ρRE = −0.35, and δ = 16.78%. Thus, this fictitious bank has
trading operations that correspond to hedge funds in the empirical papers. We find
that preventing alpha bets decreases the fictitious bank’s equity value by 11.6% and
preventing hedging decreases the bank equity value by 0.4%. Thus, consistent with
the results of our sample banks, hedging has only a small impact on the fictitious
bank. If all trading is banned then the bank’s equity value falls by 12%.
As discussed earlier, in addition to the value changes in Table 3.3, the Volcker
rule might create significant compliance costs and we do not consider those in our
model.
3.4.2 Loan prices
In this subsection we estimate how much banks should raise their loan rates to
compensate for the value decrease due to the Volcker rule. Since the rule prevents
banks from collecting trading alpha (or at least makes that harder and costly), banks
might focus more on the basic banking business. Therefore, we expect more inno-
vative banking products such as mortgages with insurances for real-estate risk (see
e.g. Fabozzi et al. 2010). These products would allow banks to collect higher fees
and this way to increase their banking alphas.
We first estimate how much the banks should raise their banking alphas to com-
pensate the value decrease of the Volcker rule. After that we calculate the corre-
sponding increases in the loan rates that would give the new banking alphas if all
the other model parameters were fixed.40 Thus, this is a simple comparative statics
40For instance, we saw this kind of behavior when the U.S. Congress limited the penalties on late payments of
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of the model. The increases in the loan rates can be viewed as a measure for new in-
novation and/or cost cutting that the banks need to do to justify the higher banking
alphas.
More specifically, we consider three scenarios (the first and the last are for the
Volcker rule). In the first, we assume that the Volcker rule allows hedging but not
the alpha bets. In this case we compare cases (i) and (ii), and find a new banking
alpha for case (ii) such that the bank equity value in (ii) equals the equity value in
(i). In the second case, hedging is prevented but not the alpha bets. In this case
we compare (i) and (iii) and estimate a new banking alpha for (iii) that produces
the same equity value as in (i). In the last case, we assume that the Volcker rule
prevents all trading (hedging and the alpha bets). Thus, in this case we compare
(i) and (iv), and calculate a new banking alpha in the same sense as with the other
cases. The new banking alphas are reported in Table 3.3. On average, the alpha bets
would raise the banking alpha by about 1 basis point (BP), the hedging by almost 0
BPS, and total trading by about 1 BP.
For the Volcker rule effect, we use the impact from the alpha bets and total
trading. Thus, by our comparative statics, banks should increase their banking
alphas by about 9.5 BPS to keep their equity value the same as before the rule.
As mentioned before, to get the higher banking alphas, banks need to create new
products and/or to improve their efficiency.
After we have the new banking alphas, we estimate the corresponding bank loan
margin changes. For this we analyze banking net income and assume here that each
bank’s NIBt equals the loan margin after default losses times the banking assets, i.e.,
NIBt = mABt−1, where m is the loan margin and ABt−1 is the the banking assets
credit cards. After the limitation credit card companies started collecting more fees from those people with sterling
credit (see e.g. New York Times, May 18th 2009, “Credit Card Industry Aims to Profit From Sterling Payers” by
Andrew Martin).
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at time t − 1. Thus, return on the banking assets is given by NIBt/ABt−1 = m.
On the other hand, if we use the same return model as with the trading assets in
subsection 3.3.3 then we have
NIBt
ABt−1
= Rf + αB + β(RM −Rf ) + ε,
where β is the beta of the banking assets and we assume it is independent of αB.
Combining the two representations for banking asset returns, we get m = Rf +αB +
β(RM − Rf ) + ε, which gives ∆m = ∆αB. That is, the change in the loan margin
equals the banking alpha change. Thus, by Table 3.2, if the Volcker rule prevents
banks from trading or just from taking alpha bets then the banks should raise their
loan margins between zero and 47 BPS (on average 1 BP) to compensate the value
decreases from the Volcker rule. We expect that big banks have least pressure to
increase their loan margins; by our comparative statics, they do not need to raise the
loan rates at all (but many banks have to decrease their trading operations). Thus,
the effect of the Volcker rule on the loan margins is quite small. This is because,
based on our model and data, banks do not benefit much from the trading and most
of the banks’ assets are in the basic banking business. Therefore, a small increase in
the loan margins compensates the value fall due to the rule.
3.4.3 Default probabilities
By (3.11), banks maximize their equity value, they do not necessary minimize their
default probability. Because banking regulators are in the business of minimizing the
default probability, banks and their regulators might have conflicting interests. For
instance, in 2008 during the recent financial crisis 21 large banks in the U.S. and
Europe paid total over $400 billion dividends which represents around one-third of
their 2007 market capitalization of $1.3 trillion (Acharya et al. 2009). The dividends
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lowered the banks’ capital and, therefore, their default probability increased.
In our model, a new regulation (or similarly a new portfolio constraint) cannot
increase the banks’ value because the rule sets constraints on their behavior.41 On
the other hand, regulation changes can increase or decrease the banks’ default prob-
ability. Unfortunately, it is not obvious what the effect on the default probability is
since banks react to regulation and this can cause positive and negative effects. This
is also the case with the Volcker rule.
If trading is profitable then ban on trading lowers the expected earnings and this
way also the expected buffer capital level. If also hedging is prevented then earnings
risk might increase. Both these effects may increase the default probability. On the
other hand, there is also a positive effect: Since Volcker rule prevents trading and, by
Table 3.2, trading earnings have a higher volatility than banking earnings have, the
total earnings volatility and this way also the default probability might fall. Thus,
the total effect on the default probability depends on the magnitude of the negative
and positive effects.42 Table 3.3 gives the effect of Volcker rule on the banks’ default
probability over 100 years, expected annual earnings, and earnings volatility. The
default probabilities are estimated by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths. By
Table 3.3, the change of the default probability from case (i) (i.e. without the Volcker
rule) to cases (ii)− (iv) (ban on alpha bets, hedging, and all trading; both estimated
and significant parameters) has correlation of -0.68 with the corresponding expected
earnings change and 0.63 with the corresponding earnings volatility change. Thus,
the expected earnings seem to drive the default probability as its correlation has a
41As discussed in subsection 3.4.1, the increase in bank value in case (ii) for banks ABVA, BAC, and STI is due
to the negative trading alpha and positive correlation estimates. To avoid this problem, we may assume that in case
(ii) and case (iv) we set a new alphaT equal to max[αT , 0]. Then their bank value in case (ii) would equal their
bank value in case (i). We did not implement this in our results.
42Keppo et al. (2010) consider banks’ market risk requirement and, according to their model, the requirement has
similar effects on the default probability as the Volcker rule.
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higher absolute value.43 This implies that the best way to hedge default risk is to
run a profitable business. Note that, by Table 3.2, the Volcker rule prevents several
banks to run their most profitable business.
The effect of Volcker rule on the default probability can be analyzed by comparing
the default probability in case (i) (without the rule) with cases (ii) (ban on alpha
bets) and (iv) (ban on all the trading). On average the Volcker rule increases the
default probability by 0.24% if only alpha bets are prevented, and by 0.24% (in the
assets-weighted sense) if all the trading is prevented. Thus, if the banks behave
optimally according to our model then the negative default effects of trading alpha
and hedging are stronger than the positive effect of a lower earnings volatility.
This effect is mainly driven by three banks (FHN, MTB, and WTFC). Their
default probabilities rise due to the Volcker rule under all cases, and in this sense
their effect is robust. By Table 3.1, all the three banks have statistically significant
positive trading alphas and their value would rise if their trading operations were
expanded. Therefore, when trading is prevented, their expected profits fall (see
column E(∆X) in Table 3.3) and this lowers the buffer capital of the three banks,
which raises the default probability.
We analyze the robustness of these findings in Table 3.3 in two ways. First,
by using the fictitious bank introduced in Subsection 3.4.1 with the hedge fund
parameters. We find that the default probability of this bank also rises due to
Volcker rule from 89% to 95%. Second, using the estimated parameters of FHN
and MTB banks in Table 3.1, we vary the parameter values to see how the default
probability responds to the change of each parameter value. By Table 3.2, the default
probabilities of FHN and MTB both rise due to the Volcker rule. Within the range
43Default probability does not necessarily increase in earnings volatility. By Figures (d) and (f) in Subsection
3.5.6, the dividend barrier rises in the volatility. Therefore, a low earnings volatility also means a low buffer capital
which could increase the default probability.
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of parameter values in the figures of Table 3.3, FHN has a higher default probability
under the Volcker rule as long as its trading alpha is positive and banking volatility
is higher than 0.1%. These two parameter scenarios indicate that the rule raises
FHN’s default probability as long as the bank benefits from trading relative to the
banking business. Thus, the effect of Volcker rule on FHN’s default probability is
quite robust and it is not driven by the banks’ unusually high trading alpha (it is
enough that the alpha is positive). By Subsection 3.3, MTB’s default probability
rises due to the Volcker rule as long as the banking proportion is higher than 98.5%,
the correlation between trading and banking cash flows is lower than 0.4, trading
volatility is lower than 2.4%, and trading alpha is over 2.2%. Thus, similarly as with
FHN, the parameter ranges for the correlation, trading volatility, and the trading
alpha imply that as long as there is enough trading value, the Volcker rule raises the
default probability. The parameter scenario of the banking book is more complicated.
By Figures (d) and (f) in Subsection 3.5.6, the dividend barrier of case (ii) is lower
than in case (i) due to the lower earnings volatility of case (ii). When the banking
proportion is higher than 98.5% then, by Figure (b) in Subsection 3.5.6, the dividend
barrier is even lower, raising the default probability - especially in case (ii). This
explains the rising default probability due to Volcker rule when ζ > 98.5%.
We doubt the hedging story and its benefits. By Table 3.2, if the hedging is
prevented then the default probability falls by 0.01% in the assets-weighted sense.
This indicates that the banks do not focus on the hedging of their default probability.
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3.5 Appendix for Chapter III
3.5.1 Model under the Objective Measure
Let us define the market return evolves as the following dynamics under the objective
measure P:
dM(t) = (r + λσM)M(t)dt+M(t)σMdW
P
M(t)
where W PM(t) is a Wiener process under P, λ is market price of risk and it is constant.
We can write this process in terms of W (t), which is a Wiener process under the
risk-neutral probability measure, as follows





Under the risk-neutral probability,
dA(t) = A(t) [µAdt+ σAdWA(t)] ,
where WA(t) = ρAMWM(t) +
√
1− ρ2AMW̃A(t), WM(t) and W̃A(t) are independent
Wiener processes under the risk-neutral probability measure and ρAM is the correla-







this gives the following P-dynamics:
dA(t) = A(t)
[










Similarly, ρM is the correlation between the market return and net income return.
WQR = λt + W
P
R and ρSM is the correlation between the market return and net
recapitalization return.
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Similarly, the buffer capital ratio dynamics (13a) can be written under P as follows



















[Xπ(u) +K][(µA − σ2A + λσAρAM)du+ σAdW PA(u)], (3.25)






























3.5.2 Optimal Trading Strategy
Unconstrained optimal trading strategy
Let θ̂(x) denote an unconstrained optimal trading strategy obtained from (3.17b)
by the first order condition i.e.
θ̂(x) = − ζσBρBT
(1− ζ)σT
− αT











If αT = 0 then θ̂(x) = − ζσBρBT(1−ζ)σT and θ
∗(x) = max{0,min(− ζσBρBT
(1−ζ)σT
, 1)}. Now
assume αT 6= 0.
Rearranging (3.26) we get
V ′′(x) = k2(x; θ̂(x))V
′(x) (3.27)




Inserting (3.27) into (3.17b) and then differentiating w.r.t. x. we come to
λV ′(x) =
(

















Replacing V ′′ by (3.27) into the above equation and solving for θ̂′(x) we get
θ′(x) =
















R + 2σθσRρRE + x
2σ2A − 2xσA(σRρRA + σθρAE))k22(x),
K1(x) = ((1− ζ)σ2T θ(x) + ζσBρBTσT )B2(x) + (1− ζ)σ2TB(x),
K2(x) = B1(x)((1− ζ)σ2T θ(x) + ζσBρBTσT ),
B1(x) = −ρAEσAσ−1θ ,








(1− ζ)2σ2T θ(x) + ζ(1− ζ)σBσTρBT
)
.
Initial unconstrained optimal trading weight θ̂(0)





+ σ2R + 2σθ̂(0)σRρRE]V
′′(0) + [µθ̂(0) + µR]V
′(0),










The first equation is from (3.17a) and (3.17b), and the second equation is (3.26)
at x = 0.
The second equation is equivalent to:
V ′(0) = −







if αT 6= 0. Substituting (3.29) into the first equation in the system and letting
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which can be solved for an implied solution θ̂0.
Constrained Optimal Trading strategy θ∗(x)
By (3.28), we get














(σθ + σRρRE − yσAρAE)k2(y) + Q(y)K1(y)αT + (1− ζ)αT
.







g(y)dy if αT 6= 0,
− ζσBρBT
(1−ζ)σT
if αT = 0,
which can be solved numerically.
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3.5.3 Model Parameters
Table 3.1: Sample Banks and Their Model Parameters over 2000 Q1 - 2011 Q4 .
Bank (Ticker) Assets, m$ BC,% Vd, % ζd, % ζ, % u, % δ, %
ALLIANCE BANKSHARES 411 0.89 2.62 86.16 N/A 0.00 N/A
(ABVA) (503)
BANK OF AMERICA 1,211,812 4.46 5.92 84.10 100.00 2.58 31.86
(BAC) (1,085,799)
COMMERCE BANCSHARES 14,438 3.96 17.12 98.93 75.00 2.45 4.69
(CBSH) (4,050)
FIRST HORIZON 29,147 3.89 7.50 97.59 100.00 3.12 16.78
(FHN) (14,441)
HEARTLAND FINANCIAL 2,549 2.12 8.05 99.94 100.00 2.49 12.62
(HTLF) (1,623)
JPMORGAN CHASE 1,190,280 2.05 7.16 75.11 N/A 0.00 N/A
(JPM) (1,029,168)
M & T BANK 49,755 4.82 10.98 99.70 75.00 2.20 20.60
(MTB) (28,978)
STATE STREET 108,343 2.36 13.87 96.42 N/A 0.00 N/A
(STT) (84,771)
SUNTRUST BANKS 147,425 6.09 6.45 97.25 100.00 0.96 99.99
(STI) (66,854)
TOMPKINS FINANCIAL 2,046 2.17 15.73 98.05 100.00 2.59 11.68
(TMP) (1,069)
WELLS FARGO 525,876 2.74 11.59 98.50 100.00 2.69 20.95
(WFC) (613,018)
WINTRUST FINANCIAL 6,688 3.29 5.45 99.96 100.00 2.09 11.97
(WTFC) (6,628)
The sample of twelve U.S. commercial banks over period 2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4. The in-sample period is 2000 Q1 –
2009 Q4, and the out-of-sample period is 2010 Q1 – 2011 Q4. Assets column is the average total asset size during
the whole sample period in terms of million USD. BC denotes the mean buffer capital ratio using the data from 2008
Q1 – 2009 Q4. The following items were calculated using the in-sample data only.Vd is the time-series average of
market capitalization divided by total assets (subscript d is for data, distincting from the model estimated value). ζd
is the time-series average of banking assets divided by total assets. u denotes the model estimated dividend barrier.
δ is computed as an implied value that matches the realized market equity value with the model equity value at the
mean buffer capital ratio given in the column BC, which is computed with only the statistically significant alphas
and correlations (the non-significant alphas and correlations are set to zero).
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Table 3.2: More Model Parameters.
Bank (Ticker) σB , % σT , % ρBT αB , % βB , % αT , % βT , % µA, % σA, % ρAE µR, % σR, % ρRA ρRE
ALLIANCE BANKSHARES 0.64 2.21 -0.35 -0.99 ∗∗ 0.76 -2.91 0.04 -3.35 10.43 0.30 -0.30 0.41 0.49 -0.48
(ABVA) (0.27) (0.38) (0.89) (1.56) (3.02) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23)
BANK OF AMERICA 0.50 0.90 -0.15 0.80 ∗∗ -0.24 -1.36 ∗∗ 0.02 12.57 11.07 0.03 1.05 1.85 0.60 ∗∗ -0.19
(BAC) (0.16) (0.15) (0.47) (0.32) (0.71) (0.16) (0.10) (0.15)
COMMERCE BANCSHARES 1.08 7.45 0.00 0.28 -0.81 -6.88 ∗ 0.05 5.13 5.13 -0.01 0.56 0.90 0.21 -0.84 ∗∗
(CBSH) (0.16) (0.34) (1.00) (2.60) (6.98) (0.16) (0.15) (0.05)
FIRST HORIZON 0.66 6.42 -0.23 -0.31 0.14 18.83 ∗∗ 0.01 2.78 12.13 0.49 ∗∗ 0.57 1.16 -0.22 -0.55 ∗∗
(FHN) (0.15) (0.21) (0.62) (2.24) (6.02) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11)
HEARTLAND FINANCIAL 0.39 23.36 -0.02 0.59 ∗∗ 0.13 -21.88 ∗∗ 1.03 ∗∗ 11.27 5.91 -0.29 0.45 0.89 0.41 ∗ -0.46 ∗∗
(HTLF) (0.17) (0.13) (0.38) (4.86) (13.54) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
JPMORGAN CHASE 0.92 0.75 0.12 0.53 -0.91 -1.21 ∗∗ 0.01 17.07 16.31 0.65 ∗∗ 0.96 1.75 0.46 ∗∗ 0.01
(JPM) (0.16) (0.29) (0.85) (0.21) (0.71) (0.09) (0.13) (0.16)
M & T BANK 0.32 1.96 -0.02 0.89 ∗∗ 0.52 2.33 ∗∗ 0.06 ∗ 11.43 12.69 -0.01 0.78 1.59 0.91 ∗∗ -0.20 ∗
(MTB) (0.16) (0.09) (0.31) (0.56) (1.21) (0.16) (0.03) (0.15)
STATE STREET 1.06 3.40 -0.17 -0.33 1.23 4.12 ∗∗ 0.03 23.54 36.30 0.03 0.96 1.30 -0.11 -0.18
(STT) (0.20) (0.44) (1.41) (1.58) (2.88) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
SUNTRUST BANKS 0.74 4.29 -0.24 0.66 ∗∗ -0.20 -8.06 ∗∗ 0.06 5.52 7.39 0.23 0.86 1.52 0.64 ∗∗ -0.33 ∗
(STI) (0.15) (0.23) (0.69) (1.59) (3.97) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14)
TOMPKINS FINANCIAL 0.45 1.43 0.74 ∗ 1.14 ∗ -0.23 -1.36 -0.01 12.01 6.12 -0.32 -0.03 0.18 0.47 0.05
(TMP) (0.13) (0.29) (0.65) (1.17) (2.01) (0.27) (0.23) (0.30)
WELLS FARGO 0.84 2.66 0.78 ∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 2.99 ∗ 0.23 0.07 18.35 18.97 -0.88 ∗ 1.06 2.06 0.91 -0.82
(WFC) (0.08) (0.28) (0.38) (0.94) (2.25) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07)
WINTRUST FINANCIAL 0.35 136.94 -0.53 ∗ 0.36 ∗∗ 0.56 67.58 -0.29 11.94 6.82 -0.10 0.50 0.77 0.70 ∗∗ -0.37
(WTFC) (0.17) (0.16) (0.52) (65.49) (213.53) (0.23) (0.12) (0.20)
All items in Table 3.2 were calculated using the in-sample data only. Each bank’s estimated σB , σT , σA, and σR are the time-series annualized standard deviation of returns
from banking, trading, assets and recapitalization, respectively. ρBT , ρAE , ρRA and ρRE are the correlations, each between the banking and trading returns, between asset
and banking/trading returns, between recapitalization and asset returns, and between banking/trading and recapitalization returns. One asterisk (∗) indicates the significance
level of 5%, and two (∗∗) indicates 1%. Each bank’s αB (αT ) and βB (βT ) are the bank’s banking (trading) alpha (excess return) and banking (trading) beta coefficient.
Standard deviations or errors of the estimates are in the parentheses.
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3.5.4 Model Value
▲	  R²	  =	  85.14%	  
y	  =	  0.714x	  +	  2.006	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.094**)	  	  	  (1.105)	  	  
☐	  R²	  =	  85.00%	  
y	  =	  0.710x	  +	  2.067	  























Model	  Value	  at	  the	  out-­‐of-­‐sample	  mean	  equity	  level,	  %	  
Figure 3.1: Actual vs. model values of banks at the mean out-of-sample equity level.
This figure shows realized market equity level during the out-of-sample period 2010 Q1 – 2011 Q4
plotted against the model value function evaluated at the mean out-of-sample equity level. The
filled triangles are with the banking and trading alphas and correlations equal to their estimated
values while the empty squares are with the statistically significant banking and trading alphas and
correlations ρBT , ρRE , ρRA and ρAE (the non-significant alphas and correlations are zero). Linear
regression lines are drawn in the figure. The numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations
of the parameters. One asterisk (∗) indicates the significance level of 5%, and two (∗∗) indicates
1%.
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Table 3.3: Effects of trading. (i) Base case is with the estimated parameters; (ii) is the case with trading alpha
αT = 0; case (iii) is with ρBT = 0, i.e., zero correlation between the banking and trading earnings; case (iv) is
with zero ρBT and αT . V is the model bank equity value in terms of the risk weighted assets. ∆V/V is the value
change relative to the base case value. αB is a (new) banking alpha that gives the same bank equity value as in the
base case. ∆αB is the difference between the base case αB and the new αB . DP denotes the default probability
during the next 100 years (by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths and time discretization ∆t = 1/365 a year).
E(∆X) and Std(∆X) are the annualized average and standard deviation of ∆X, respectively. u denotes the model
estimated dividend barrier.
Bank Cases V , % ∆V/V,% DP,% E(∆X),% Std(∆X),% αB ,% ∆αB ,% u,%
BAC (i) Base case 5.92 100.00 -0.68 1.67 0.80 2.58
(ii) αT = 0 5.92 0.00 100.00 -0.68 1.67 0.80 0.00 2.58
(iii) ρBT = 0 5.92 0.00 100.00 -0.68 1.67 0.80 0.00 2.58
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 5.92 0.00 100.00 -0.68 1.67 0.80 0.00 2.58
CBSH (i) Base case 17.12 14.86 -0.02 0.69 0.28 2.45
(ii) αT = 0 17.12 0.00 14.86 -0.02 0.69 0.28 0.00 2.45
(iii) ρBT = 0 17.12 0.00 14.86 -0.02 0.69 0.28 0.00 2.45
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 17.12 0.00 14.86 -0.02 0.69 0.28 0.00 2.45
FHN (i) Base case 7.50 84.67 -0.08 1.09 -0.31 3.12
(ii) αT = 0 4.92 -34.36 100.00 -0.79 1.36 0.16 0.47 1.89
(iii) ρBT = 0 7.50 0.00 84.67 -0.08 1.09 -0.31 0.00 3.12
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 4.92 -34.36 100.00 -0.79 1.36 0.16 0.47 1.89
HTLF (i) Base case 8.06 68.76 -0.03 0.69 0.59 2.49
(ii) αT = 0 8.06 0.00 68.76 -0.03 0.69 0.59 0.00 2.49
(iii) ρBT = 0 8.06 0.00 68.76 -0.03 0.69 0.59 0.00 2.49
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 8.06 0.00 68.76 -0.03 0.69 0.59 0.00 2.49
MTB (i) Base case 10.99 77.62 -0.08 0.92 0.89 2.20
(ii) αT = 0 10.92 -0.62 78.15 -0.08 0.92 0.89 0.01 2.21
(iii) ρBT = 0 10.99 0.00 77.62 -0.08 0.92 0.89 0.00 2.20
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 10.92 -0.62 78.15 -0.08 0.92 0.89 0.01 2.21
STI (i) Base case 6.45 100.00 -4.05 4.31 0.66 0.96
(ii) αT = 0 6.45 0.00 100.00 -4.05 4.31 0.66 0.00 0.96
(iii) ρBT = 0 6.45 0.00 100.00 -4.05 4.31 0.66 0.00 0.96
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 6.45 0.00 100.00 -4.05 4.31 0.66 0.00 0.96
TMP (i) Base case 15.76 30.67 -0.01 0.65 1.14 2.59
(ii) αT = 0 15.76 0.00 30.67 -0.01 0.65 1.14 0.00 2.59
(iii) ρBT = 0 15.76 0.00 30.67 -0.01 0.65 1.14 0.00 2.59
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 15.76 0.00 30.67 -0.01 0.65 1.14 0.00 2.59
WFC (i) Base case 11.61 70.38 -0.04 0.95 0.83 2.69
(ii) αT = 0 11.61 0.00 70.38 -0.04 0.95 0.82 0.00 2.66
(iii) ρBT = 0 11.61 0.00 70.38 -0.04 0.95 0.82 -0.01 2.66
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 11.61 0.00 70.38 -0.04 0.95 0.82 0.00 2.66
WTFC (i) Base case 5.45 97.55 -0.11 0.66 0.36 2.20
(ii) αT = 0 5.45 0.00 97.55 -0.11 0.66 0.36 0.00 2.20
(iii) ρBT = 0 5.35 -1.84 99.47 -0.16 0.70 0.37 0.01 2.22
(iv) αT , ρBT = 0 5.35 -1.84 99.47 -0.16 0.70 0.37 0.01 2.22
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3.5.5 Buffer Capital
We illustrate how our model explains cross-sectional variation in the banks’ buffer
capital ratios (equity capital ratios above the minimum capital level) before the
Volcker rule. Figure 3.2 represents the actual maximum capital buffer ratio against
the model predicted capital level taken to be the dividend barrier u in Table 3.1.
This plot uses banks’ maximum capital buffer ratios over 2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4 as the
measure of the actual buffer ratios.
▲	  R²	  =	  33.63%	  
y	  =	  0.649x	  +	  1.684	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.288*)	  	  	  (0.763)	  
	  
☐	  R²	  =	  32.86%	  
y	  =	  0.587x	  +	  1.721	  
























Model	  Dividend	  Barrier	  u,	  %	  
Figure 3.2: Actual vs. model buffer capital ratios for the sample banks. This figure shows
maximum buffer capital ratios (during 2000 Q1 – 2011 Q4) plotted against the corresponding model
dividend barriers. The filled triangles are with the banking and trading alphas and correlations equal
to their estimated values while the empty squares are with the statistically significant banking and
trading alphas and correlations ρBT , ρRE , ρRA and ρAE (the non-significant alphas and correlations
are zero). Linear regression lines are drawn in the figure. The numbers in the parentheses are the
standard deviations of the parameters.
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3.5.6 Comparative Statics
Figure 3.3: Comparative Statics. We use the following median parameter values over all the
banks: ζ = 95%, r = 2%, σB = 0.5%, σT = 2%, ρBT = −0.1, αB = 0.1%, αT = 3%, δ = 18%,
µA = 9%, σA = 7%, ρAE = −0.01, µR = 0.5%, σR = 1%, ρRE = −0.3, ρRA = 0.4 and x = 1%.
Figures below show how the value function (3.13d) and dividend barrier u change with respect to
banking proportion ζ, banking volatility σB , trading volatility σT , correlation between the banking
and trading earnings ρBT , banking alpha αB , trading alpha αT , risk-free rate r, and wedge between
debt and equity finance δ, mean asset growth rate µA, asset volatility σA, correlation between net
income earnings and assets growth return ρAE , correlation between assets growth return and net
recapitalization earnings ρRA, mean net recapitalization rate µR, net recapitalization volatility σR,


















Banking	  propor*on	  ζ,	  %	  


















Banking	  propor2on	  ζ,	  %	  

















Banking	  vola*lity	  σB,	  %	  



















Banking	  vola2lity	  σB,	  %	  
















Trading	  vola*lity	  σT,	  %	  


















Trading	  vola1lity	  σT,	  %	  



















(3.4.7) Value function vs. correlation between bank-



















(3.4.8) Dividend barrier vs. correlation between
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Figure 3.4: Default probability changes with varying model parameters for Bank FHN.
We analyze two banks (FHN and WFC) and how their default probability changes with respect to
model parameters. We consider two cases: case (i) is without the Volcker rule and case (ii) is under
the Volcker rule (no alpha bets). The first bank is FHN and we use its estimated parameters in Table
3.2. Figures below show how the default probability changes with respect to banking proportion
ζ, risk-free rate r, banking volatility σB , trading volatility σT , banking alpha αB , trading alpha
αT , correlation between the banking and trading earnings ρBT , correlation between net income
earnings and net recapitalization earnings ρRE , correlation between assets and net income earnings
ρAE , correlation between net recapitalization earnings and assets ρRA, assets growth rate µA, net
recapitalization returns on assets µR, assets volatility σA, net recapitalization volatility σR, wedge
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Figure 3.5: Default probability changes with varying model parameters for Bank WFC.
The second bank is WFC and we use its estimated parameters in Table 3.2. Figures below show
how the default probability changes with respect to banking proportion ζ, risk-free rate r, banking
volatility σB , trading volatility σT , banking alpha αB , trading alpha αT , correlation between the
banking and trading earnings ρBT , correlation between net income earnings and net recapitalization
earnings ρRE , correlation between assets and net income earnings ρAE , correlation between net
recapitalization earnings and assets ρRA, assets growth rate µA, net recapitalization returns on
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Our goal of this study is to develop a framework with which we are able to measure
and analyze the impact of Volcker rule on banks’ market equity value and default
probability. We have developed two models in which a bank aims to maximize its
expected future dividends i.e. the bank’s market equity value. The models divide
banks’ trading into alpha bets and hedging of basic banking cash flows. We assume
that the Volcker rule can be implemented and that it bans alpha bets or all trading.
We have shown that if the alpha of a bank’s trading strategies and the correlation
between its trading and banking cash flows are both zero then it is optimal for the
bank not to trade at all.
Further, we calibrate the models to a sample of twelve U.S. banks. We use these
banks because for them required accounting data for our analysis is available in
the Compustat Database. Our empirical results with the limited accounting data
indicate that the equity value of the banks would fall on average by about 1% (in
the assets-weighted sense) due to the Volcker rule, this fall could be compensated
by raising loan margins by about 1 basis point, and that the rule would increase
the banks’ default probability on average. The default probability rises because the
rule cuts the banks’ profitable operations. As a robustness check, we have confirmed
101
that the decreased equity value and increased default probability in the results of
our sample banks are consistent with the case of a bank with hedge fund parameter
estimates.
Our analysis is based on the pre-Volcker rule situation under which several banks
may have had profitable or unprofitable trading due to certain economic conditions.
We do not know if the trading profits are sustainable and how they are generated
(could be partly due to market making). However, we have shown that the rule
can raise the default probability of a bank even under a small trading alpha. We
ignore implementation costs and risks of the regulation. These important issues are
considered in other papers. However, even under our stylized model that assumes
that the rule can be implemented without costs, its benefits are unclear.
The Volcker rule may have unintended consequences such as increasing default
probability of a bank and therefore harming the stability of the U.S. financial system.
Those need to be analyzed and measured.
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